Lots of politicians were wrong about lots of things this primary
season. Mitt Romney was wrong to believe that millions and millions
spent in Iowa and New Hampshire on TV ads months before the voting
began would secure wins there. Rudy Giuliani was wrong that his
huge lead in February 5 states would hold up after he declined to
make a serious effort to compete in earlier states.
Lots of political gurus missed the boat as well. Refashioning
Romney as a social conservative standard-bearer and establishment
Republican ranks up there with the all time bad consultant ideas.
Giuliani’s team made certain no future campaign will try the
“Florida or bust” strategy. The National Right to Life Committee’s
judgment that Fred Thompson was the more electable of the pro-life
candidates turned out to be comically wrong.
The pundits repeatedly got it wrong — missing the rise of Mike
Huckabee and the potential for McCain resurgence and mistaking
Giuliani’s celebrity for political support.
As for me, I certainly had my share of swings and misses. Yes, I
did predict the swift demise of Fred Thompson and warned that
Huckabee’s effort in Iowa would not be slowed by Club for Growth or
Romney’s immigration ads. I frequently opined that Romney’s many
flip-flops would raise huge character questions and be his
undoing.
However, I would be remiss if I did not point out a few of my
more egregious mistakes, so here goes:
1. I paid attention to national polling months and months before
the primaries began. The Romney team was right here and I was
wrong: the 2007 national polling proved to be meaningless. The
temptation to respond to pollsters and media hype about the latest
poll proved irresistible but misguided.
2. During the bulk of 2007, I assumed that social conservative
support for Giuliani reflected a sign that they might accept his
candidacy. More likely, the polling reflected a deep and abiding
respect for the 9/11 hero and his very high name recognition. Given
their druthers, many religious right voters eventually chose a
candidate, Huckabee, more aligned with their values and policy
positions.
3. I overestimated the influence of national pundits and
underestimated the importance of local media. I did not appreciate
how influential the Union Leader would be in New Hampshire
and the potential for McCain to use its words as a shield and a
sword against Romney. I assumed that the 24/7 drumbeat of attacks
by mainstream media and national conservative opinion makers
against Huckabee would doom him in Iowa; it may have simply
emboldened his followers.
4. I assumed that illegal immigration would be a determining
factor in the GOP primary. It became the subject of thousands of
e-mail blasts, web and TV ads, new terms of art (“sanctuary
mansion”), and testy debate exchanges. However, McCain has
prevailed in multiples race (including Florida, with the help of
Hispanic voters) and not a single state’s primary’s outcome turned
on this issue. For all the contentiousness surrounding immigration,
the GOP candidates reached a simple consensus: border security
first.
5. I could not imagine that Bill Clinton would descend to the
lowly status of race baiter and junk yard attack dog. I wrongly
assumed he would be a tremendous asset to his wife and that he
cared about his historical legacy, not just the chance to return to
power. His behavior entirely surprised, indeed stunned me.
6. I vastly underestimated the appeal of Barack Obama and the
Democratic primary electorate’s yearning for an idealistic, pure
liberal. Sullied by the ethical and political compromises of the
Clinton years, they seem to have suddenly realized they could do
better. I underestimated both the degree to which “experience”
would prove irrelevant in their calculation and the degree to which
Obama would improve and toughen as a candidate.
In reviewing this list of errors and miscalculations, the only
thing I can say in my own defense is, I had plenty of company.
