Kosovo is preparing to declare independence with American
support. Although the Bush administration apparently expects
nothing much to happen, the process is likely to be both divisive
and destabilizing.
Relations among Europe, Russia, and America could sour. Serbian
politics may lurch further to the nationalist right; the Radical
Party’s Tomislav Nikolic led the first voting round for president
Sunday before last. Another Balkans war is possible, though
thankfully unlikely.
Friends of Kosovo’s independence argue that stability isn’t
everything. The U.S. has no intrinsic interest in Kosovo’s status
and would be best served to stay out of it, but that ship sailed
long ago.
Washington spent most of the 1990s working overtime to break up
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia while forcing ethnic Serbs to remain in
the newly independent states. The new countries Bosnia, Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia were allowed to form, but Serbs
locked in Bosnia and Croatia, in particular, were expected to
cheerfully accept their fate.
The U.S. applied the same policy to Kosovo, a constituent part
of Serbia. In 1999 Washington led NATO in a military campaign to
aid the ethnic Albanian forces, eliminating Serb authority over the
territory.
The Bush administration has built on the Clinton
administration’s policy. After presiding over unproductive faux
“negotiations” predicated on Kosovo’s ultimate independence, the
administration now plans to recognize the new nation even if it
fails to win United Nations approval.
Of course, Washington insists that all ethnic Serbs living in
Kosovo must remain in the new state. As before, secession from
Serbs is okay, but secession by Serbs is prohibited. Sound
fair?
GRANTED, SORTING THROUGH the conflicting claims involving Kosovo
ain’t easy. Once Serbian heartland, it hosts the site of the Battle
of the Blackbirds, where the Serbs lost to the Ottomans in 1389
(the loss probably shaped Serbian consciousness more than would
have a victory — such is the way of the Balkans).
Over time the population shifted to an ethnic Albanian majority,
in part due to Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito’s efforts to
dampen Serbian nationalism in the multi-ethnic communist state.
In the 1980s it was Serbians who complained of
misconduct by the ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo. In 1982, the
New York Times reported on “almost weekly incidents of rape,
arson, pillage and industrial sabotage, most seemingly designed to
drive Kosovo’s remaining indigenous Slavs—Serbs and Montenegrins
— out of the province.”
That all changed after Slobodan Milosevic used an appearance in
Kosovo in 1987 to ignite Serb nationalism and leapfrog into
national leadership. With his rise, Belgrade reasserted Serb
control over Kosovo.
When Yugoslavia broke up, the secession of Bosnia and Croatia
produced particularly gruesome conflicts, since both of those
provinces contained many ethnic Serbs who wished to remain
independent if not in Serbia.
Although ethnic Serbs may have been responsible for the bulk of
atrocities, Bosniacs and Croats also freely murdered Serbs and each
other. The largest single episode of ethnic cleansing prior to the
Kosovo war was conducted against ethnic Serbs in Croatia’s Krajina
region, where the battle damage remained evident for years. Most of
Krajina’s ethnic Serb residents have yet to return.
Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo also deteriorated as the 1990s
proceeded. Serb rule was heavy-handed; Albanians, who made up the
vast majority of the population, created alternative government and
social institutions; the Kosovo Liberation Army (labeled a
“terrorist” group by the U.S.) began attacking Serb officials and
Albanian “collaborators”; the Serbian government responded
brutally; fighting expanded and casualties increased.
EVEN AS 1999 dawned, the war, though tragic, was minor as ethnic
and sectarian conflicts go, costing perhaps two thousand lives over
a couple of years. About the same time a quarter of a million
people were slaughtered in Sierra Leone. But the Clinton
administration, led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
decided to go to war against Serbia, and American bombers forced a
quick surrender.
Since 1999 the territory has been run by the UN and NATO, more
or less. After the allied victory ethnic Albanians kicked out
200,000 or more Serbs and other minorities, such as Roma. Kosovo’s
guerrillas took over as leaders — of both the political system and
abundant criminal enterprises. Three years ago ethnic Albanian mobs
arose to murder and displace ethnic Serbs, and to burn and wreck
Serb homes, churches, and monasteries.
Perhaps it’s no surprise, then, the U.S. and Europeans want to
be done with the mess that they helped to created. Desultory
negotiations over Kosovo’s status occurred over the last two years,
but the outcome was never in doubt. The allies made clear to the
ethnic Albanians that independence would result if no accord was
reached, so no accord was reached.
The Serbs refused to be bought off with the promise of European
Union membership and the Russians said no to another Western fait
accompli. So now Kosovo plans to declare independence, perhaps in
days, and the U.S. and most Europeans say they will recognize the
new state.
The most sensible policy for Washington would be to step back
and indicate that there will be no recognition without genuine
negotiations, that is, talks without a predetermined outcome,
between Kosovo and Serbia.
On the table should be all options, including overlapping
citizenships (Kosovo, Serb, EU), and secession within secession,
that is, allowing the ethnic Serbs concentrated to Kosovo’s north,
principally around Mitrovica, to remain in Serbia.
THE U.S. SHOULD halt the independence bandwagon, though not because
Washington has an intrinsic reason for objecting to Kosovo becoming
a separate nation. In principle the status of this particular piece
of real estate should not matter much to America. Whether the
ethnic Albanians or Serbs rule in Pristina is intrinsically
irrelevant to U.S. interests.
However, Washington has spent more than a decade unbalancing the
Balkans. By accelerating the break-up of Yugoslavia with the early
recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence, the allies
short-circuited negotiations, most importantly over the status of
minorities within the breakaway states. U.S. diplomats also
discouraged early settlement of the Bosnian conflict, further
bloodying allied hands.
Washington and Brussels have done the same in Kosovo. Starting
in 1998 the allies took the side of the ethnic Albanians,
encouraging their intransigence in ensuing negotiations. Maybe a
peaceful outcome was never possible. We will never know because of
U.S. and European intervention.
After the 1999 Kosovo war, the allies essentially promised the
ethnic Albanians independence and dismissed any compromise, such as
allowing ethnic Serbs to secede from Kosovo. All the while the West
blamed Belgrade for refusing to accept the ethnic Albanian
position. Now those same allies are greenlighting a declaration of
independence by Pristina.
The outcome of this strategy is not likely to be pretty. There
will be a new, violent, and unstable state, permeated by crime and
possibly open to terrorists, in the Balkans.
This will push Serbia away from Europe, conceivably leaving a
large economic and political hole in the Balkans. The allied
approval of Albanian self-determination will encourage other
secessionist movements in the Balkans and elsewhere as ethnic and
political minorities demand the same “right” of independence.
Western dismissal of Russia’s interests will make Moscow more
antagonistic and assertive. Failure to resolve the status of Serbs
within Kosovo risks triggering conflict between ethnic Albanians
and Serbs, and possibly Kosovo and Serbia.
Nice work all around.
Washington still has time to say no and mitigate some of the
consequences of its past meddling in the Balkans. But, at this
point, the odds aren’t good.
