It is definitely the political season in Iran. News of political
activity in that country is streaming out from all corners. This is
quite a change from the normally highly controlled information
flow. The fact that Washington now has altered its assessment of
the imminent production of an Iranian nuclear weapon, however, does
not change the internal dynamics of Persian politics.
A regular aspect of Iranian exile politics — a principal source
of news from inside Iran — has been to furnish reports to the
media of active dissent in their homeland. Rival groups compete
with each other to get the attention of the Western media. It’s
still difficult to judge news sources, but there is no question
that Iran’s information industry is bubbling with rumors of change
in process. The real test for change will begin with the
parliamentary candidate registration process beginning in January
and ending with the elections in March.
Out front of the reformist movement is a surprisingly
reinvigorated Mohammad Khatami, the former president. Ayatollah
Khatami has once again assumed the mantle of leadership of the
reform movement in general, even if more as a symbol than an
individual political power. Khatami has been willing to allow
himself to become the focus of renewed vigor of political reform.
He has appeared at rallies and attended policy meetings with key
cabinet aspirants. A serious attempt to build a legitimate
opposition to President Ahmadinejad’s regime is under way.
The first hurdle, however, is not with the electorate but with
the Council of Guardians. The real behind-the-scenes politicking
must be done within this powerful constitutional instrument of the
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which acts as the first
line of control over who does and does not run for Iran’s 290-seat
parliament.
It is the reformers’ hope that Ayatollah Khamenei and his
advisers react to the economic shortfalls that are an ever-present
reality in Iran. Unemployment is high and growing worse. Inflation
cuts the ground out from underneath serious governmental efforts to
control rising prices. The bureaucracy under the leadership of
Ahmadinejad and his fundamentalist acolytes displays an
incompetence that is apparent at every official level.
Nonetheless, the aggressive president tours the country with
seeming endless energy, placing blame for governmental ineptitude
and economic incomprehension on all the usual suspects — the great
and lesser satans of the West. In his version of good old pork
barrel politics, Ahmadinejad dashes about the provinces promising
whatever is wanted, whenever it’s wanted. Soft loans, public works
projects, new subsidies — all are offered without clarity
regarding how they will be provided.
In the larger cities, though, there seems to be a strong
reaction among the electorate for change back to a time when there
appeared to be a glimmer of return to the “kinder gentler” days
when claims they might be bombed into dust by the Americans were
not a national rallying cry. About ten thousand people
turned out in Meshad to support Khatami, demanding change from
Ahmadinejad’s bellicose leadership.
In opposition to the political psychological urge for a less
threatening environment is the rather obvious growth of civil and
social power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. During the
presidency of Ahmadinejad, a fervent supporter of the IRGC, the
organization has vigorously stretched it domestic economic power
through private business dealings. Traditional business instruments
have been challenged, thus creating elements of internal conflict.
It’s an area on which reformers can delicately, but effectively,
play.
The international sanctions led by the United States have had a
conspicuous impact on Tehran’s ability to do business. The
financial system available to Iranian business has become
increasingly difficult to negotiate in spite of the numerous covert
government-owned private companies established to circumvent
controls. It is as yet unclear what effect President Bush’s
announcement that Iran had ceased its nuclear weapon development
will have on the continuation of existing trade and finance
restrictions.
There are signs that former president Mohammad Khatami has been
willing to act as the forerunner in the merging of reformists and
the conservative forces of the other ex-president, Hashemi
Rafsanjani. The key maneuver being mooted is a plan to have the
pragmatic Rafsanjani step into the leadership role when it comes
time for Ahmadinejad to be replaced.
As in all things Persian, that which is apparent is not
necessarily what exists. Iranians don’t know any other method of
operating. One thing is for sure, however: whatever is evolving
must have the approval of the supreme leader and Council of
Guardians. But the mere fact that movement is being observed
publicly is not a good sign for Ahmadinejad. This winter and spring
will show the way, and he knows it. All sides will be watching
their backs.
