Perhaps the starkest success of the Bush administration’s
“freedom agenda” was the bloodless Rose Revolution that swept the
appealing and U.S.-educated Mikhail Saakashvili into the presidency
abdicated by ex-Soviet holdover Eduard Shevardnadze. But today,
Saakashvili’s bona fides as a democratic ally are destroyed. His
opponents at home, who dared to band together, brought scores of
thousands into the streets to demand reforms that finally included
Saakashvili’s own resignation. Saakashvili’s reaction demonstrated
both ruthlessness and megalomania. He sent enforcers into the
streets and stopped broadcasts from Georgia’s most-watched
channel.
Saakashvili won’t be leaving power any time soon, in other
words, unless he leaves the hard way. And in making that choice, he
has left the United States, his lone and indispensable patron,
holding the bag. It’s possible that the U.S. could have seen this
coming, of course. It’s likely that the rise of Saakashvili, at the
head of a popular movement for democracy and law, was far better
than any alternative. America’s unquestioning support, to the great
irritation of Moscow, may have exacerbated Saakashvili’s ability to
consolidate power. But blame for his foolishness in placing self
above country — the acknowledged stamp of the tyrant since
classical Greece — rests with Saakashvili alone. The question now
is what the U.S. is to do about it.
The attempt to work through the answers is an uncomfortable one,
as Irakly George Areshidze shows clearly in the Weekly Standard
(“The Bloom Is Off the Rose Revolution,” November 26, 2007). A
former opposition political strategist, Areshidze cannot help but
stumble through contradiction and conundrum in seeking out a
coherent policy suitable for Bush. The goal is to “still show the
world” that the administration’s “commitment to democracy abroad is
more than just talk.” But the playing field is littered with
embarrassing obstacles.
Areshidze, for example, lauds deputy assistant secretary of
state Matt Bryza for insisting that Saakashvili reopen the popular
Imedi television station, but criticizes him for recognizing that
the Georgian government truly saw a revolutionary threat at hand.
Imedi was promptly made illegal. As is now typical, Saakashvili’s
position is both accurate and unconscionable: that since many
Georgians want to end his administration, and since he is
the government, therefore many Georgians want to overthrow the
government. So Areshidze must admit that the opposition “claimed
not to want another revolution” while exactly “that would have been
the effect of what they demanded.” Alas, the real revolution has
already happened under Saakashvili. His usurpation of the rule of
law has transformed the recovery of political liberty into a de
facto act of rebellion. The system is now structured to ensure
Saakashvili wins.
So Areshidze faces a daunting challenge in supplying the Bush
administration with suggestions for how to move forward. Having
warned that “it was unnecessary and unwise” to demand Saakashvili’s
resignation, Areshidze places himself in the awkward position of
insisting three paragraphs later that “early presidential elections
and the lifting of the state of emergency” are “not enough.” As is
obvious, “a perfect balloting process will be meaningless if the
opposition is prevented from mounting a serious campaign.” Why
Saakashvili would crush a seriously mounted and popular but
peaceful uprising only to allow its participants to vote him out of
office defies reason and imagination.
Even more spectacularly, Areshidze believes that the U.S. “can
push the Georgian government to deal fairly with those accused” and
“punish those in the government who used unjust force” in
conjunction with Russia. To expect Moscow to collaborate
with Washington in tuning up a government the Russians hold in
loathing and contempt is to traffic in fairy tales. Only clear
guarantees on NATO and Georgia’s breakaway regions would earn
Russian cooperation. And those very terms describe the objective of
Russian Caucasus policy — the piecemeal reintegration of lost
territory within the political order of the Kremlin. If we are
willing to accept this outcome — something we may have to do
anyway, given Saakashvili’s reckless egotism — there are ways to
bring it about with considerably less groveling.
Saddest of all, however, is Areshidze’s recognition that, even
with elections deemed free and fair by American standards, the fix
could be in regardless. “Saakashvili could still use state
resources to advance his candidacy,” he laments — “dispensing
welfare benefits to buy votes, for example.” “Mounting a credible
campaign is impossible without money.” These are truths Americans
recognize every election year. Areshidze must fall back upon an
absurd syllogism — that since Imedi is run and part owned by News
Corporation, “it is the least partisan channel in Georgia, and
people trust it.” Rupert Murdoch is no Mikhail Saakashvili, but to
set standards for trustworthiness with Saakashvili as the benchmark
is in a way already to admit defeat. Georgia shouldn’t have to
import its impartiality from the same patrons that prop up its
tyranny. But for Areshidze, there seems to be no choice.
And so we are left with the bottom line: “Until these conditions
are met, steady pressure” — the tired old “clear and consistent
message” — offers “the best hope for a return to the democratic
path.” Translation: tell Saakashvili, after years of unconditional
patronage, to do as a good hireling should.
I am not persuaded, and neither will be Mikhail Saakashvili.
America’s options in Georgia, though unattractive, are clear:
(1) Fold. Inform Saakashvili that unless he steps down
within two weeks and restores political liberty in one, U.S.
support will immediately and permanently cease, leaving his ego to
whatever fate Moscow sees fit to devise.
(2) Go all in. Shift U.S. aid and support to Georgia’s
real democrats. Admit publicly that Saakashvili has failed his
country and usurped its power. Agree with Russia that democracy
will be reinstalled in an independent Georgia otherwise to be
restored to the status quo.
(3) Ante up. Continue supporting Saakashvili, helping
him suppress his opponents as elegantly as possible. Determine that
the weakness and strategic importance of the Georgian state is such
that the risk of collapse or civil war cannot be run under any
circumstances. Pay off the opposition to accept the injustice.
In my judgment, Option 1 offers the most clarity, Option 2 the
most honesty, and Option 3 the least risk. None are the sort of
policy one would have hoped for in 2005. But an essential part of
any “freedom agenda” is exactly hope itself. Ultimately a policy of
support for spontaneous democratic revolutions places practical
trust in the ability of new democrats to construct governments with
enough political and civic liberty to remain durable. And even when
this is achieved, one may find that the political party most
effective at maintaining order after open elections is, for
example, Hezbollah. Whether hope — a virtue that ought never to be
expelled from policymaking — is therefore to be made its
centerpiece and final justification is an issue the U.S. needs to
treat both quickly and frankly.
