Last week, in advance of U.S. Undersecretary of State John
Negroponte’s visit to Pakistan over the weekend, President Pervez
Musharraf moved to diffuse the crisis that has gripped his country
since his extra-constitutional declaration of emergency rule on
November 3. Musharraf promised to finally renounce his position as
General and take the oath of office as a civilian president by
December 1st, released former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto from
house arrest, and appointed an interim Prime Minister to oversee
elections in January that he has affirmed will go forward.
Is it time to be optimistic about Pakistan? Not quite. Musharraf
has been promising for years to take off the uniform, and it’s easy
to understand why he hasn’t done so; Pakistan’s military is, by
far, the country’s most powerful institution, and there has always
been the risk that if Musharraf were to relinquish his post as
chief of the army his successor would become the real leader of
Pakistan and leave the President a mere figurehead. Perhaps
Musharraf will follow through on his promise this time, which may
mean that he’s insured that his closest allies remain in control of
the military. It’s quite proper that the military should answer to
a civilian president. But until someone other than Musharraf
himself holds that post, there’s no way to know whether the chain
of command ends with the office of the presidency (as it should) or
merely with the man who happens to hold that office.
Assuming it’s the latter, Musharraf could remain a dictator
entirely unchecked by any meaningful constitutional order unless he
voluntarily agrees to share power with a democratically elected
parliament. Opposition leaders doubt that free and fair
parliamentary elections can be held while the state of emergency
continues. They’re probably right, especially if Musharraf
continues to use the state of emergency as an excuse to arrest not
just radical Islamist rabble-rousers but also mainstream
democrats.
Where do U.S. interests lie? Our first imperative is to prevent
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from coming under radical Islamist
control. Our second is to maintain our alliance with Pakistan
against Taliban- and al Qaeda-affiliated militants along the
Pak-Afghan border. Both of those goals can be helped along by the
development of a democratic order.
Radical Islamists have done poorly at the ballot box in
Pakistan. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, the Islamist parliamentary
coalition, received only 11 percent of the vote in the 2002
elections (and only 26 percent in the North-West Frontier Province,
the MMA’s stronghold). Yet the radicals clearly have a reservoir of
potential support in the 45 percent of Pakistanis who, in a 2005
Pew survey, reported either “a lot” or “some” confidence in Osama
bin Laden “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.” If
Pakistanis can express themselves at the polls, they will support
the moderate parties — but if they can’t, they may well become
sympathetic to the radicals who are willing to oppose the
government by violent means. By stoking popular discontent with his
state-of-emergency crackdown, Musharraf is playing with fire.
Negroponte called on Saturday for Musharraf to lift the state of
emergency. Musharraf has refused. It’s time to pressure him to reconsider
with more than just words.
U.S. taxpayers have sent $10.58 billion to Pakistan since
September 11, 2001. Close to 60 percent of that total has gone
toward Coalition Support Funds, which are intended to reimburse
Pakistan for assistance in the war on terror. This funding should
be left in place; to cut it off would be self-defeating. But what
about the other 40 percent? Ten percent has gone to humanitarian
aid (including an aid package that responded to the October 2005
earthquake). Fifteen percent has gone toward major weapon systems
that have little to do with counterterrorism. And another 15
percent has gone toward what is euphemistically called “budget
support” — a direct cash transfer to the Pakistani government that
is, in practice, untraceable, most of which likely ends up lining
the pockets of influential military officers.
It is the latter two categories of aid that can and should be
re-examined. The Bush administration — and congressional
appropriators — should make clear that the U.S. will cut off the
30 percent of aid that buys houses and anti-tank missiles for the
military unless Musharraf reinstates the constitution and agrees to
share power with a parliament elected in free and fair elections
certified by international observers. If those demands aren’t met,
we should be fully prepared to adjust aid accordingly. If you can’t
buy influence, after all, there’s no point in paying for it.
