By Gustavo Coronel on 9.26.07 @ 12:07AM
Hugo Chavez's proposed constitutional reform confirms the dictator's readiness to move slowly but irreversibly.
How do you kill a frog? By placing it in a pot of lukewarm water
and slowly turning up the heat. If the temperature goes up too
quickly, the frog will jump out. But if it goes up just slowly
enough, the frog will boil to death.
This analogy explains why violent political insurgencies have
often failed in Latin America. To succeed in consolidating power, a
would-be dictator has to seize it slowly.
In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez recently unveiled a bold new proposal
for constitutional reform. It's not clear if and when it'll go
through, but if it succeeds, he will have boiled the frog --
becoming a dictator while working under a system that looks
democratic from a distance.
Chavez's reform involves only about 30 of the existing 350
articles of the Constitution, but it is hardly a minor revision. It
contains sweeping reforms that, if approved, would give Chavez the
status and power of a tropical monarch.
The national executive will assume control of many activities
previously in hands of state and municipal governments, such as the
management of state and municipal hospitals and schools, as well as
the administration of ports, airports and toll roads.
The president will have the authority to dissolve the National
Assembly and convene a Constituent Assembly. It's hard to think of
a more bald-faced instance of replacing rule of law with rule of
man.
The president's term will be seven years, and he could be
re-elected indefinitely, as opposed to the existing seven year-term
and a limit of two consecutive presidential periods. In addition,
he will be authorized to name as many vice-presidents as he deems
desirable, accountable only to him, to oversee economic or
political areas of activity.
The president could decide how to use international financial
reserves, robbing the Central Bank of its autonomy, and spooking
foreign investors. This will further erode the credibility of the
government in the eyes of the international financial community,
and increase net capital outflows from the country.
The president could also create new cities, new Federal
Territories and new Federal provinces, a power he will no doubt
abuse to reward his supporters.
The country will have a six-hour workday. Apparently Chavez
hasn't paid much attention to the state of the workers' paradises
of western Europe. This will lower industrial productivity even
more, increasing unemployment in the medium-term and making the
country less competitive.
The president will promote military officers, another authority
previously in the hands of the National Assembly. The "Bolivarian"
Armed Forces will include a new component, the Popular Militia,
modeled after the Cuban Popular Army or the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard -- a semi-official military organization that functions as a
state within a state, empowering and enriching the president's
supporters. Chavez describes it as an army trained to fight a
guerrilla war against the "U.S. invasion."
The State will be socialist, both in a political and an economic
sense, although private property will still be allowed, insofar as
it does not collide with national interests. This model has proven
a failure wherever it's been attempted.
Chavez has learned the importance of pursuing his plans
incrementally. In February 1992, he tried seizing power in the
traditional manner. After planning his coup for 10 years, it all
came crashing down in 10 hours, thanks to his military ineptitude.
In 1998, he won the presidency through elections, and though elated
by the victory, he was depressed at the prospect of playing by
democratic rules. Accordingly, he has focused his efforts on
becoming a dictator while maintaining democratic pretenses.
Chavez's latest reform would be the object of a national
referendum organized by the National Electoral Council, an
organization he controls, and Venezuelans distrust deeply.
Venezuelans thus face the dilemma of participating in a vote to
install a "constitutional" dictatorship or abstaining altogether.
Both alternatives have their risks.
Democracy loving Venezuelans are against the wall, but,
paradoxically, so is Chavez. If the people, pressured to vote on
the elimination of democracy in the country, opt instead for a
massive popular protest, Chavez could be ousted again, as he was in
April 2002, when some 700,000 indignant citizens marched against
his abuses of power. As happened then, the frog could jump. But
this time, it might result in civil war.
Gustavo Coronel is the author of the Cato Institute study,
"Corruption, Mismanagement and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chavez's
Venezuela." He served on the Board of Directors of Petroleos de
Venezuela (1976-79), as president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de
Vida, and was the Venezuelan representative to Transparency
International (1996-2000).
topics:
Constitution, Law, Military, Iran, Oil
