By George H. Wittman on 8.20.07 @ 12:07AM
The country's dominant Islamist party finds a new way to weaken the country's secular military.
It is rare that a relatively young political leader with his
party holding 340 of the 550 seats in parliament would choose to be
a candidate for the presidency of his country when the post has
been authoritatively referred to as "symbolically important but
ostensibly ceremonial." That is exactly the case in Turkey where
the current foreign minister, the 56-year-old Abdullah Gul, darling
of the conservative, politically Islamist Justice and Development
Party (AKP), has put him forward for the seven-year term as
president of that country.
The expectation of an agreement on a non-partisan candidate
acceptable to all sides had been blown away with the strong AKP
victory at the polls in July. The closeness of the AKP's majority
now to a necessary two-thirds of the parliament makes it possible
to amend the constitution giving more weight to Islamic values.
Interestingly, the AKP's alliance with the 27 parliamentarians of
the Kurdish southeastern provinces may be what tips the
balance.
The Republican People's Party (CHP) with its mere 112 delegates
can no longer be the strong political ally of the Turkish military
that it once was. This shift in the political power balance leaves
the armed forces greatly weakened as the traditional arbiter of
Turkish secular life.
The military has seized control four times since 1960, and
finally in 1982 created a constitution that was aimed at bringing
unity without religious interference into Turkey's political life.
It all seemed logical and correct as an effort to prevent what had
become periodic outbreaks of conflict and violence usually
involving separatists and religious partisans.
In recent years the increasing attraction of Islamic traditions
undoubtedly has brought strength to the neo-Islamist AKP, often
through the strong direction of its leader, the former mayor of
Istanbul and now prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan,
however, has specifically declined moving on to the presidency,
preferring apparently to remain active in the cut and thrust of
Turkish politics while having the diplomatically skilled Abdullah
Gul in the presidential chair.
This could be a very astute move by Erdogan who has effectively
used his foreign minister as point man in Turkey's still determined
desire to gain full membership in the European Union. EU membership
-- or even the dream of it -- acts as an element of political
cohesion for Turkey. The AKP considers the stringent democratic
rules of the EU club as a block to Turkey's traditional military
dominated politics, while those on the historical right view full
accession to the EU as the fulfillment of Mustapha Kamel Ataturk's
great western ambition for his country.
Gul is perceived as a more Islamic-oriented figure. In spite of
his protestations that he will steadfastly protect Turkey's
secularism, Gul is still viewed by many in Europe as an "Islamic
politician." Moving Abdullah Gul into the prestigious but far less
operational role of president is the type of political maneuver
that satisfies the Turkish political mindset -- and also rubs the
military nose in their loss of civilian political power. Animosity
is another driving factor in Turkish politics. So is the fact that
by constitutional law the president picks the chief of the general
staff, the man who commands Turkey's army, navy and air force.
This, however, brings up the Turkish army's role in securing the
country's southeastern Kurdish border. The Kurds now in parliament
can make up the two-thirds bloc necessary to put Gul in as
president in the first two rounds of voting. The AKP want their
support and the Kurd minority of Turkey wants the military presence
diminished on Turkey's Kurdish-dominated border with Iraq. A deal
can be made, though in the end the AKP still hold the upper
parliamentary hand, for in the third ballot they need only a simple
majority.
No matter what happens, in the final analysis certain factors
will stay the same. The Kurds in Turkey will remain a source of
separatist fervor and tension with Kurdistan, Iraq. The Turks will
have to maintain a consistent secularization of their political
life if they ever expect to gain full accession into the EU. And,
finally, any government of Erdogan/Gul will have to work to rebuild
Turkey's once strong ties to the United States if they wish to
maintain their country's special political, military and economic
relationship with Washington -- as Washington will have to do in
turn.
topics:
Islam, Constitution, Law, Military, Iraq, European Union