Nobody likes it when American allies are left holding the bag.
Those on the right complain that we abandon friendly regimes out of
weakness of will, whereas those on the left use our exit to blame
the U.S. for ever getting in. For these reasons abandonment feels
like an order of execution, or at least of life imprisonment. South
Vietnam was not the first little state to be swallowed up in our
wake. The one criticism Americans lob at Churchill concerns his
infamous complicity in Stalin’s carve-up of Eastern Europe, sealed
with a hand-lettered map on a napkin. And now we wonder if Iraq is
next.
Freedom of thought is a good thing, like freedom of movement on
the battlefield — especially when wiggling through the tight spots
of foreign affairs. For too long in Iraq, “stay the course” has
meant not just strategic but tactical obduracy. But now, the humble
returns on our massive investment have led some commentators to
advocate, instead of an inst-o-matic exit from Iraq, an audible
known as the “Kurdish Option.” By redeploying to Kurdistan, the
case is made, we can salvage four worthy goals:
1. Our troops will depart a lethal, intractable civil war
between Sunni and Shia.
2. The U.S. will retain the force necessary to hunt and kill al
Qaeda in Iraq from a secure forward base.
3. The defense of Kurdistan will help ensure that democracy and
the rule of law flourish for at least one ventricle in the heart of
the Middle East; and
4. Americans will prove to the Kurds, to the world, and to
ourselves that we don’t leave close friends in the lurch when the
going gets tough for us.
Of these, Goal 4 is paradoxically the most important — though
it has the least to do with hardheaded military and geopolitical
strategy. But judging the other three goals, on the likelihood of
their success after a Kurdish redeployment, suggests that the best
way to fail the Kurds might actually be to send them bulk of our
armed forces.
START AT THE TOP of the list. First, the attractions are obvious
for a policy of disentanglement. Iraq’s rival factions are caught
in a conflict only politics can solve, without recourse to all-out
war. But whether the warring parties will halt magically at the
Kurdish border is doubtful. Nothing is more important, whether
winning or losing a civil war, than an ally of convenience with a
good army, and the Kurds’ Pesh Merga is certainly that. The
strategic city of Mosul is a frontier jewel, an irresistible draw
sure to worry, and entice, the Kurds accordingly. The more
important Kurdistan becomes — and the greater the percentage of
U.S. troops there, the more that it does — the more at the mercy
of their neighbors are the Kurds.
This must have slim appeal. The Turks have already pressured the
U.S. to decapitate the PKK, widely recognized as a terrorist
organization comprised of unbending Kurdish guerrillas. Our
undersecretary of defense for policy has confessed we intend to
oblige our NATO ally. This situation can only worsen when Sunni
Iraqis begin casting about for allies against Iranian-backed Shia
militias.
Pulling back to Kurdistan will get us out of the thick of it
only to inspire the thick of it to follow us there.
Second, the hope that our concentrated forces can launch
effective attacks against al Qaeda from Kurdistan fades on close
inspection. Prior to that mission, we would very likely face a
gauntlet, because we’d have to:
1. Put down Kurdish terrorists, a move guaranteed to irritate
both local government and rank and file.
2. Massage Turkish expectations as their army awaits along the
border; and
3. Fend off incursions and overtures from Sunni and Shia alike,
none too pleased with our decision to favor neither side as they
bleed themselves dry.
If, that is, we do manage to stay somehow neutral. In reality we
will follow Iran’s lead and support one or both sides, betting the
way campaign contributors do. Our hands, in short, will be full,
precisely because we withdrew to Kurdistan. This is very little
gain for a very lot of trouble.
Third, it’s now apparent that the pressures our occupation will
place upon the Kurds — even at their behest — will greatly
challenge their ability to run a model democracy. Kurdistan is a
pro-American but not terribly democratic land. Tribes and militias
have won what independence the Kurds have been able to earn. The
Pesh Merga is a force as deserving of local trust and loyalty as it
is unconducive to civilian government. This is not a dig against
the Kurds. But it is another proof that undue expectations are the
ruin of good hopes. We ought not dare foist the same dreams of
hearts and flowers that distorted our view of Iraq upon the last
portion of that country that seems capable of seeing to its own
affairs without great violence.
THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION is that a relocation to Kurdistan will
probably not solve any of our present problems and will likely make
all of them worse. The pain will be particularly awful because of
the sensation that the Kurds are our last ditch proteges. It will
be terribly hard, if the going gets tough, not to egg on a
declaration of Kurdish independence, which will give the Turks
apoplexy and hasten the dismemberment of Iraq. Accompanying this
will almost certainly be another round of strife as Kurds struggle
to abandon their eternal aspirations (and brethren) in Turkey.
There is nothing outlandish in expecting a rush of Turkish Kurd
refugees after that.
Though we could gain the approximation of a formal colonial
relationship, where rules are clearer and force can effectively be
applied, we would lose a great deal in the bargain. Not least would
be the embarrassment of having tried shiny, happy quasi-imperialism
— only to be stuck with the ignominious, old school version.
Occupying Kurdistan would invite grand dreams, and feverish, almost
desperate hopes, of a success all the more important for its
diminished scope and higher stakes. But relocating to Kurdish
territory would also invite the worst of all possible worlds: the
surrender of Iraq to its fate and the shackling of our own troops
to whatever fate awaits them — in a Kurdistan that we will
guarantee is unable to escape the Iraq we left behind.
