Winning the hearts and minds of a civilian populace is a highly
laudable goal in military strategy. Unfortunately it only works in
a relatively peaceful environment.
One of the political casualties of the war in Iraq is the theory
of appealing to the hearts and minds of its citizenry. Millions of
dollars have been spent on social and community projects and little
has been accomplished by the Iraqi people in gaining an
understanding and appreciation of the peaceful ambitions of the
United States.
Many examples can be given of tactical success of local efforts
by dedicated civil affairs units of the American military. Schools
and playgrounds along with libraries and other community buildings
have been rebuilt. Imaginative programs interfacing with local
leaders have been pursued with vigor.
The combat soldiers have received repeated lectures on the need
to avoid civilian casualties and when possible show a friendly face
to the Iraqi public. U.S. medical units have assisted in
battlefield treatment of injured civilians and aided wherever they
could what is left of the Iraqi civilian health structure.
Except for providing interesting subjects for journalists when
the IEDs, RPGs and mortar rounds are not exploding, the battle for
the hearts and minds of Iraq has been an exercise in futility.
Sadly, good copy does not necessarily translate into successful
operations.
The term “struggle for the hearts and minds” evolved from the
Vietnam War, but the organized effort to do so has been part of the
military training and doctrine since World War II. American
Military Govt. (AMG) units followed advancing U.S. forces through
Sicilian, Italian, French and German towns in an effort to bring
civil order out of the chaos war had left behind. It wasn’t
difficult to create good will among people who had been left with
so little after the war moved on — even if they previously had
been enemies. But therein is the key.
Later in Korea and Vietnam, U.S. Army Civil Affairs units tried
the same techniques that had worked before. And, yes, when “the war
moved on” these efforts had a degree of success. But we should have
learned from ‘Nam that if the war doesn’t move on and leave peace
behind, no amount of good will, kind acts, and constructive effort
will have a positive, lasting effect on the host populace.
There was a crude and simple guide heard from spec ops forces
regarding efforts to gain understanding and appreciation in Viet
Cong-influenced villages. “Grab’em by the balls and their hearts
and minds will follow.” The best example of the success of such
direct and unsophisticated methods was the much maligned Phoenix
Program which brutally retaliated for village chief cooperation
with the VC. The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister and Dep. Prime
Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, put it equally simply after the war when
he said Phoenix “wiped out many of our bases” (Stanley Karnow,
Vietnam, A History, p. 602).
The preoccupation with political correctness in U.S.
pacification operations in Iraq has found precedent for the most
part in the successful civil action in South Vietnam’s peaceful
provinces and not in the regions of strong VC presence. Preaching
to the converted is not an appropriate test.
Instances of civil successes in conflicted Iraqi provinces have
occurred only after covert operations to pay off or kill local
tribal leaders who were assisting the insurgency. The peaceful
regions are easy enough to deal with until they come under
insurgent pressure.
Of course, it is logical to maintain good relations to the
extent possible with indigenous groups. In this regard care must be
given to avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties. Similarly,
efforts must be put forth to assist local government, business, and
social groups in rebuilding normal community life — again where
possible and prudent. Unfortunately that requires an absence of
insurgent action.
There is an essential lesson of warfare that must be learned by
the American public. The rest of the world does not wage war in a
manner consistent with American values. Winning the hearts and
minds of an indigenous people in areas of conflict and especially
those torn asunder by religio-political rivalries, is a concept
that works well on paper but not in practice. Winning hearts and
minds works only if the citizenry do not have a greater fear of
retribution by terrorists.
The essential goodness of the American spirit wants to believe
in the transcendent value of the golden rule of doing unto others
as you would have them do unto you. In Iraq this is an excellent
peacetime guide, but it is not the way they fight war. (See
“Real
Torture,” Jeff Emanuel, TAS, 6/12/07.) Gaining the
Iraqis’ good will can come only after they have exhausted their
societal bellicosity.
