In the past American policy has characterized al Qaeda in Iraq
as primarily consisting of non-Iraqis — foreign fighters smuggled
in to disrupt the nation building plans of the coalition. There are
indications that this order of battle evaluation has now been
changed.
The surge operation created by Gen. David Petraeus has, among
other things, shaken up the field intelligence and as a result
there are reports of a revision of the military assessment of the
make-up of al Qaeda-related forces in Iraq. A consensus appears to
have evolved recently that these elements are now staffed
substantially with Sunni ex-Saddam military and intelligence
personnel along with certain of their tribal brethren organized
into the traditional terrorist cell structure.
While there has been in the past the view that strong support
for the Wahhabist form of Islam was a cohesive characteristic of al
Qaeda recruits, more and more such a requirement appears to have a
lessened priority. The strategic objective of proselytizing this
radical form of Islamic teaching has been subordinated to the
tactically more important anti-Western, anti-U.S./Israel ethos.
In the case of Iraq an additional anti-Shia element also has
been added as a motivating force. Evidence that al Qaeda has been
cooperating with Shia Iran in smuggling operations from Pakistan’s
Baluchi territories in the east simply shows pragmatism also has
its place.
One of the operational reasons for al Qaeda to lean toward
indigenous Sunni operatives in Iraq was that foreign fighters were
too easily differentiated from local Iraqis — even though they may
have seemed the same to Americans. An Iraqi Arabic speaker has a
breadth of accent and dialect as different from Saudis, Egyptians,
etc. as a New Yorker does from a denizen of New Orleans.
Another important operational factor is the need for each al
Qaeda cell to be able to operate with trustworthy local support and
cover. For a clandestine activity to remain effective, it must not
merely remain hidden within the local environment, but also gain
active support in intelligence gathering from the community within
which its members are seeking to blend.
There is an interesting additional factor that encourages the
use of former Saddam specialized military cadre beyond their
obvious technical competence. Operational access, discipline, and
innovation among these individuals are higher than among foreign
fighters deployed in an environment with which they do not have an
instinctive relationship. These are basic rules of insurgency, well
advised on from T.E. Lawrence to Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara, among
others.
There are of course disadvantages to having al Qaeda operations
lean heavily toward Iraqi Sunni personnel rather than foreign
fighters. The first weakness evolves from one of its strengths;
namely the tribal connections that supply such an advantage as a
support mechanism conversely also can encourage internal
conflict.
The tribal structure in Iraq often harbors great traditional
inter-group animosity. Crossing tribally perceived areas of
influence holds considerable danger of destroying operational
cohesion and security. It is in this arena that an unaffiliated
foreign al Qaeda presence as mediator could be of particular
value.
Another problem for al Qaeda in Iraq is in the area of financial
management. Funding for al Qaeda operations has tended to come
largely from external sources. Such a mechanism provides a
principal control instrument on operations. As Iraqi Sunnis come to
dominate the local al Qaeda, the financial administration passes
into their hands and reduces external leverage.
Clearly there is a potential for Iraqi Sunni loyalty to al Qaeda
to diminish in proportion to the growth of Sunni military
independence of organization. As the nation of Iraq more and more
tends toward a tripartite confederation, the potential increases
for the evolution of a separate Sunni regular military force
similar to the only partially nationalized Kurdish Pesh Merga.
None of these problems, however, outweigh the advantages of al
Qaeda in Iraq currently moving toward a predominant Iraqi Sunni
personnel structure. It appears clear that they may have already
recognized this fact and have taken steps in that direction.
As with all such groups, the strength of al Qaeda as an
international terrorist organization is its adaptability.
Concomitantly this is also the greatest challenge in countering its
operations.
