Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami is the single most
powerful organization in Iran. The direct English translation is
Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution or the Iranian
(Islamic) Revolutionary Guards Corps, as it is popularly known in
the West. Their recent seizure of British sailors and marines has
reminded the world once again of their disregard for international
norms.
Western media and politicians have tended to simplify the role
of the Pasdaran as a praetorian guard for the clerical regime —
essentially an elite military unit. While this is true, it is only
part of the story.
Formed in May 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to counter the
established left-wing militia, the Pasdaran was the first military
revolutionary instrument completely under Iranian clerical control.
As such it swiftly became the protector not only of the Islamic
revolution, but of the clerical leadership itself.
From its earliest stages, membership in the Pasdaran assured a
special political status. Heroic fighting during the Iran/Iraq War
(1980-88) made them truly the guardians of the nation far more than
the regular armed forces.
In the late 1990s a reformist government under President
Mohammad Khatami was voted into office, much to the annoyance of
the far more conservative clerical leadership in the Council of
Guardians, the ultimate governing body of Iran’s Islamic
revolution. With the support of this body the Pasdaran now took on
a more active role in internal security aimed at, among other
things, countering the reformist movement.
Reporting directly to the office of the Supreme Spiritual
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the Pasdaran developed its own
independent foreign intelligence organization, control over missile
and nuclear research, and even a separate naval and air capability.
In other words, the Guardians of the Revolution became equivalent
to an enhanced version of the Shutz Staffel, the vaunted SS of Nazi
Germany.
Since the first Gulf War the Iranian leadership has encouraged
the Pasdaran to go into business as a way to covertly supplement
its funding. In this manner the organization gained an element of
self financing — and the ability to kick back upstairs a portion
of the profits. Its private business activity allowed the Pasdaran
to create a covert slush fund for illicit operations and embargoed
technology.
From 1997 on the role of the Pasdaran grew in all aspects of
political affairs, domestic and foreign. This was extended to
economic and strategic matters. Pasdaran commercial involvement
expanded into active participation in both legitimate business and
the burgeoning black market. This clandestine commerce increased
exponentially after the international sanctions took hold.
The annual profit on these white, gray, and black market
enterprises has been estimated at well over a billion dollars.
Former Pasdaran ranking officers have taken up major political
roles in the Iranian parliament and now form an impressive voting
bloc.
Perhaps most important in business terms is the Pasdaran’s
increasing role in Iran’s energy and transportation programs. One
of their companies, Khatam-ol-Anbia, last year won a $1.3 billion
contract to build a gas pipeline and an affiliate obtained the $1.2
billion construction contract for the metro line in Tehran. The
head of Khatam -ol-Anbia is Brig.General Abdol-Reza Abed, the
deputy commander of the Pasdaran.
In the broad military context the Pasdaran also has had the
responsibility for the operations in Iraq and Lebanon of special
operations forces known as the “Quds Force” or “al Quds.” In
February, the defection of Brig. General Ali Rez Asgari, a Pasdaran
hero who had risen to the position of Dep. Defense Minister, deeply
embarrassed the Pasdaran leadership, to say nothing of the exposure
of considerable covert information.
This defection was followed a month later by the unexplained
disappearance in Iraq of a top al Quds operations officer, Col.
Amir Mohammad Shirazi, and preceded in January by the arrest by
U.S. forces in Irbil of five members of a self-proclaimed
“diplomatic liaison office.” All of the latter have been
characterized as al Quds operatives, and the American ambassador,
Salmay Khalilzad, has dubbed one of them the director of al Quds
operations in Iraq.
Such was the situation affecting Iranian operations in Iraq when
the British personnel were captured. An Iranian diplomat who had
been kidnapped by unknown elements in Iraq was conveniently
released prior to the return of the Brits. Meanwhile the much
expected exchange of the five al Quds officers so far has not been
achieved. If this circumstance remains unchanged, the frustrated
Pasdaran will certainly try again to obtain another bargaining
chip. Organizationally they cannot afford the embarrassment of
inaction.
For those who are looking towards reformist changes in Iran to
alter the direction of that country, it would be well to recognize
the spider web of military, political, and economic control now in
the hands of the radical and avaricious Army of the Guardians of
the Islamic Revolution.
