The Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Sheffer, recently
has been quite outspoken regarding the need for a missile shield in
Europe. In de Hoop Sheffer’s mind the only real problem is the cost
of the weapons, site construction, and the division of that cost
among the participating European states.
What is striking is the secretary general’s disregard of
Russia’s strident objections to the effort of the United States to
arrange for missile interceptor sites and integrated radar to be
placed in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively. Apparently
NATO has judged the bellicose Russian reaction to the potential of
such basing to be empty political posturing.
The argument that is being made at NATO headquarters in Brussels
is that Iran’s Shahab-6, its true intercontinental missile, will be
operational in eight years. This intelligence is combined with a
pessimistic assessment regarding prevention of the development of
an Iranian nuclear weapon. Apparently the evaluation of this
information has led NATO planners to conclude that they must opt to
protect all of Europe.
The surprising thing is that there has been no immediate outcry
from the usual hip-shooting Russian Defense Ministry. Perhaps First
Dep. Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who now is effectively defense
czar, is currently too involved with his own presidential election
efforts to give much credence to what a NATO secretary general
says. On the other hand, the Russian military may be loath to
escalate the rhetoric to a European scale when threats against the
already burdened Americans are a much more welcome international
matter.
One of the other things at play here is that Moscow must be
already in the process of developing its own advanced missile
defense system. Russia’s problem is not a simple one in that it
must protect itself from Asia, the Middle East and Europe, as well
as the United States — if the traditional Russian paranoia is
still operative.
Unless the Russians make the calculated judgment that their
thousands of nuclear-armed missiles are enough of a deterrent in
themselves to make unnecessary an anti-intercontinental ballistic
missile defense system, one can expect rather soon the word to be
“leaked” that Moscow is about to test its own advanced ABM
system.
All of which tends to expose the fact that the vociferous
Russian objection to American interceptors in Poland and radar in
the Czech Republic is more a matter of leftover pique from Moscow’s
loss of dominance over eastern Europe. Putin doesn’t really give a
strategic damn over a bare screen of ten interceptors in Poland
clearly targeted against Iran. He just doesn’t want the Americans
taking up a position — even if it’s defensive — in the USSR’s old
satellite states.
In domestic political terms Putin believes Russia must maintain
the image of an internationally powerful, and thus influential,
strategic capability. Putin and his acolytes, Dmitri Medvedev and
Sergei Ivanov, as well as the rising star, Sergei Mironov, have one
principal objective in mind: Move Russia into a position of
exercising the clout that the old Soviet Union once had, but
without the inherent danger and expense.
Part of this is done with mirrors, and part with judicious
defense investment. But much of it is accomplished by a vigorous
economy and an even more vigorous and consistent diplomatic
offensive whenever possible. International strategic policy is a
combination of political, diplomatic and military strength.
Ironically, the assassination of anti-government journalists and
activist dissidents, such as Litvinenko in London, is a clear mark
of weakness rather than the strength for which the perpetrators had
hoped. President Putin and the rest of the Kremlin leadership
appear to be a regime incapable at best of controlling their own
supporters, or, at worst, their own most base instincts.
Aside from their many missiles and nuclear weapons, the Russian
military is nowhere near the class of the American military
services. Its economy is flying high at the moment on the
production and price of its exportable oil. The vulnerability in
that sector is the limited term of its proven reserves (60 billion
barrels) as calculated by British Petroleum. Some estimates
indicate commercially exploitable reserves will be substantially
diminished in less than 10 years.
In politics, intelligence, and diplomacy, however, Moscow is
still a first rank contender, if not a super power. It would be
wise for Washington to remain attuned to this — now and after
2008, no matter who is the American president.
