The American Spectator

At Large

Prisoner of War

By William Tucker on 3.14.07 @ 12:09AM

(Page 2 of 2)

Sure it was worth knocking out Saddam and there have been big benefits from the initial invasion -- convincing Libya to give up terrorism and revealing the nuclear cabal in Pakistan. The problem seems to have come with what historians call "imperial overreach." It wasn't enough to depose Saddam and hand the country back to the Iraqis -- we had to first remake it in our own image.

I just finished Imperial Life in the Emerald City, the account of four years in the Green Zone by Washington Post bureau chief Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Like everyone else, Chandrasekaran believes the intentions were good but the execution has been terrible. He offers the example of our efforts to remake the Baghdad Stock Exchange.

The Iraqis had an age-old system, built mostly around hand-written transactions and people's word. It had worked for decades. The Coalition Provisional Authority was eager to get it back up after the invasion but decided to remake it in the process. Somehow the job ended up in the hands of a 24-year-old honcho who had applied for a White House job and convinced someone he knew all about stock exchanges. The 24-year-old spent almost a year trying to build a completely electronic system -- "the most transparent stock exchange in the world" -- before finally settling for what was essentially the same old system. The heroic effort delayed the reopening a year, and meanwhile most of the businesses drifted away.

That mistake has been repeated over and over. The most catastrophic decision, everyone seems to agree, was "de-Baathification" -- the decision to decapitate the police force and disband the army in order to purge the veterans of Saddam's regime. "I did an interview with some former Baath officials a year later and every one of them was now in the insurgency," says one veteran reporter. The decision was Paul Bremer's and Paul Bremer's alone. Everyone in the military, the State Department -- and even President Bush himself -- seems to have disagreed. But the impulse is the same as everyone else's -- wipe out the past and re-create Iraq in our own image.

ON MONDAY MORNING, BRIGADIER GENERAL Dana Pittard, commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, held a press conference at CPIC. Because it was right across the hall, I was able to attend. Pittard is a modest, persuasive African American who reels off the names of assistant Iraqi police captains in Anbar Province like a well-prompted TV anchorman. You couldn't find a better spokesman for our country. Patiently he answered reporters' questions about whether the Iraqi army is performing up to expectations, whether they are sharing intelligence, whether ethnic rivalries still predominate.

Finally, I decide to ask a question. "General Pittard, a lot of people feel the turning point here occurred with de-Baathification. Without commenting on the past, can you tell us if there's anything that might be called 'de-de-Baathification' going on where people are forgetting about the past and allowing members of the former regime to rejoin the ranks."

It turns out there is. "I myself thought de-Baathification was way overdone -- way, way overdone," said General Pittard. "But Prime Minister Maliki met with a group of former Baath officers last week and urged them to rejoin the army. So we may be making some progress in that direction."

In fact, the best strategy right now might be to undo a few more rifts of the past few years. One of the most visible symbols of the unraveling is the Golden Dome of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which still lies in ruins since Musab al-Zarqawi blew it up a year ago. The Sunnis (who predominate in Samarra) rebelled when Muqtada Al-Sadr's Shi'ite militia showed up announcing they were going to rebuild it. Samarra's Sunni have tended the mosque for centuries and actually cherished it since it brought lots of Shi'ite tourists. But they bridled at the arrival of the Shi'ite militia and feared it would lead to a "Shi'ification" of their city.

If the Iraqi government and America's occupying army wanted to kick off a reconciliation, they could hardly do better than to arrange a deal where Sunni and Shi'ites could work together in rebuilding the shrine without the militia. Instead, the city remains a hotbed of interethnic strife.

Or at least that's what they tell me. I'm headed up there to begin my embedment with the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne.

William Tucker is a special correspondent for The American Spectator currently embedded with the U.S. Army in Iraq. This is the third report he's filed. Click here and here for his earlier stories.

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