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YET IF THE PRESIDENT VIEWS the latest plan as a solution to the excruciatingly painful North Korean nuclear crisis, one has to ask: what took the administration so long? The latest accord follows the Agreed Framework in practice as well as in spirit, and almost certainly could have been inked years ago. Despite the president's insistence on Chinese involvement, the plan actually took form in bilateral U.S.-North Korean talks in Berlin last month -- the very direct conversations which the administration refused to conduct for nearly six years. John Bolton was characteristically blunt: "This is the same thing that the State Department was prepared to do six years ago. If we are going to cut this deal now, it's amazing we didn't cut it back then."

What has the administration accomplished since then? When President George W. Bush took office, the DPRK was thought to possess enough plutonium to make one or two atomic bombs. Analysts figure the North's arsenal today at as many as 13 potential weapons. The DPRK also has been testing missiles, raising the possibility that some day North Korea could target America.

Even if the administration was justified in dumping the Agreed Framework, officials were criminally negligent in having prepared no coherent follow-up. The administration's recurring fulminations against Kim Jong-il were charming after a fashion, but completely ineffective. North Korea demonstrated what it thought of the views of the "international community" when it conducted a nuclear test last October.

Another price of spending six years getting an agreement is the substantial debt owed the People's Republic of China (PRC). Much credit for the Joint Statement belongs to China, the official host of the six-party talks. For the last six years the administration has been emphasizing a multilateral approach. It has alternately attempted to shame, persuade, and beg Beijing to bring the DPRK to the negotiating table. The U.S. also has pushed the PRC to pressure the North to agree to yield up its nuclear weapons in the ensuing talks. Beijing appears to have delivered what Washington desired.

China pressed North Korea to join the sporadic six-party talks. After Pyongyang's nuclear test, Beijing agreed to limited sanctions, a significant change in policy. Moreover, the PRC acted on Washington's request to crack down on the Banco Delta Asia bank in Macau, which handled North Korean money. In short, if allied persuasion or outside pressure was the cause of North Korea's agreement, it was persuasion by and pressure from China.

David Zweig of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology told the San Francisco Chronicle: "China clearly brought the North Koreans to the table and made it possible for the Bush administration to make the necessary concessions to get an agreement." Similarly, argued Zhu Feng of Beijing University: China left the DPRK with "no choice but to show increasing flexibility."

Indeed, both President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly lauded the PRC's role. "Perhaps the most significant voice that had been added to the table was China," said the president.

WASHINGTON UNDOUBTEDLY IS GRATEFUL for the PRC's assistance. But Beijing likely desires more than abstract gratitude. The more geopolitical favors it called in to win the DPRK's agreement, the more geopolitical favors China likely expects from Washington.

Indeed, the recent agreement is just the beginning. There are numerous decision points where the North might -- in fact, is likely to -- balk, threaten to quit, demand additional concessions, and more. The U.S. will be expecting, or at least hoping for, China's continuing assistance to keep the accord on track. Although Beijing has a stake in the agreement's success, a rupture would embarrass Washington far more.

The Bush administration may not have formally offered a quid pro quo. Even so, the PRC's support has created an expectation of American reciprocity. That could mean less pressure on human rights, fewer complaints over exchange rate and trade practices, increased pressure on Taiwan to dampen independence sentiment, or less enthusiasm for a more activist Japanese foreign policy. A failure to deliver could result in less Chinese, and ultimately North Korean, cooperation in the future.

The DPRK nuclear crisis has been boiling for more than a decade. There are several reasons why Pyongyang might desire to build a nuclear weapon. With the only alternatives military strikes, economic war, bribes, or sweet reason, the new accord might offer the best shot for success. But had the administration offered the same terms six years ago, we probably would know whether Pyongyang was serious about abandoning its nuclear course. If so, North Korea would possess fewer potential nuclear weapons. And Washington would owe China fewer geopolitical favors.

Will the Joint Statement work any better than previous accords with North Korea? We will soon find out. Just days after the agreement was signed, Pyongyang announced that it will maintain "full combat mobilization" to deter attack by the U.S. and DPRK officials praised the nation's nuclear weapons. But even if the plan holds, the price of administration procrastination has been very high.

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Foreign Policy, Trade, Military, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Energy, Oil