The American Spectator

Special Report

Appeasing North Korea

By Doug Bandow on 2.20.07 @ 12:07AM

There is a sense of deja vu on the Korean peninsula. American and North Korean negotiators shaking hands. An agreement for disarmament and peace in Northeast Asia.

That was the promise of several past accords, most notably the Agreed Framework, drafted by the U.S. and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1994. Now Washington and Pyongyang have inked another disarmament plan, known as the "Joint Statement."

The Bush administration argues that this plan is different from the Agreed Framework. It's formally multilateral, but the largest financial contributors to the older arrangement were Japan and South Korea.

The Joint Statement commits the DPRK to freeze nuclear operations and eventually shut down its nuclear reactor and reprocessing facilities -- just like before. Pyongyang will be rewarded with energy assistance, diplomatic recognition, and trade ties, as with the Agreed Framework. The main difference, an important one, is that more DPRK performance must precede Western aid.

Perhaps Pyongyang is serious this time. Moreover, the Western investment is modest: just 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil before North Korea is to shut down its Yongbyon reactor, within 60 days. If Pyongyang attempts to welch or renegotiate, it should become obvious soon.

HOWEVER, THERE ARE NUMEROUS long-term pitfalls. The deal provides for access by personnel from the International Atomic Energy Agency "to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between the IAEA and the DPRK." Will the North actually accept intrusive inspections and not attempt to cheat?

Lead U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill has talked of "complete denuclearization," but the Joint Statement speaks of "abandonment" and "disablement," not "dismantlement." That could be mere semantics -- or allow the DPRK to work to preserve its nuclear infrastructure. After the plan's release, the North Korean media spoke of agreeing to the "temporary suspension" of Pyongyang's nuclear program.

Moreover, the North is to list "all of its nuclear programs" that "would be abandoned." The Joint Statement lists plutonium extraction, but not the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program that Pyongyang denies possessing.

The new accord commits Japan and North Korea to resolving their differences. That may be a tough task, and not just because of DPRK intransigence. Japan so far refuses to contribute to the energy aid package because of the unresolved North Korean kidnapping of scores of Japanese citizens over the years.

Will the North turn over all of its plutonium and any weapons it has developed, the quantities of which Washington can only guess? The Joint Statement speaks of "denuclearization," but does not explicitly mention existing stockpiles or demand total disarmament.

Nothing was said about the light water nuclear reactors that the DPRK was to receive under the Agreed Framework. The September 2005 agreement, which underlies the Joint Statement, envisions discussion of that issue "at the appropriate time." Alas, the U.S. and North Korea might have different definitions of "appropriate."

Finally, the latest accord creates five working groups. Their plans are to be "implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner." Even if Pyongyang is committed to the agreement, these multiple talks may be both torturous and tortuous.

For these reasons and more many analysts are skeptical. Some of the president's allies are more hostile. Former UN envoy John Bolton complains that the Joint Statement "sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world."

Nevertheless, there's still a good argument for the arrangement. No deal would ever be possible without giving the North money and respect. Even a freeze is better than continued North Korean advances. The Joint Statement should be viewed as another modest step in a long, continuing process.

Most important, other options are limited. Military action would risk triggering a full-scale war. Effective sanctions would require the active assistance of China and South Korea. Regime change is obviously desirable but not readily achievable. Doing nothing ensures the North's development of a significant nuclear arsenal. In a world of second bests, the negotiations may have produced the least bad alternative.

Letter to the Editor

topics:
Foreign Policy, Trade, Military, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Energy, Oil