The American Spectator

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O'Sullivan: I am not a soldier and I have only limited experience of the Middle East. So it would not be sensible of me to lay down a detailed prescription for how to win in Iraq -- or even how not to lose. That leads me to suggest three general points. The first is the old British Army maxim: when you have a man on the spot, you must either back him or sack him. What you can't do is continually second-guess him from a position of greater ignorance. Probably we [hadn't] sacked enough generals -- but we have certainly maximized confusion by having the administration constantly micro-managing policy when it couldn't even agree on a single strategy. These faults are now likely to be aggravated by the report of the Iraq Study Group which combines defeatism with wishful thinking in about equal proportions.

The second general point is that the U.S. cannot leave Iraq until a relatively stable and friendly government is established there. If it tries, it will simply have to return. That's not because of neoconservatism or any other left-wing bogey but because an Iraq that is either another anarchic Afghanistan or a second Iran would be a massive threat to American interests both there and here. Discussion of Iraq in Washington at present seems to ignore the main strategic fact that Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas are allies in a radical campaign to remake the Middle East as an Iranian region of influence. Insofar as the ISG report considers this, it is to propose a plan that -- when it is stripped of its wishful thinking -- amounts to arguing that the radicals can obtain their objectives by a regional conference rather than by force if they allow America a graceful exit. Such a plan would require the betrayal of Israel which, however, is unlikely to go gentle into that goodnight. So even the defeatism of the ISG report is wishful thinking!

The third general point is that American difficulties in Iraq are due not to some inevitable doom but to errors of judgment that can still be corrected. In particular, our enemies within and outside Iraq are not frightened of us -- and with good reason. We didn't shoot looters after the fall of Baghdad; we backed off from the first battle of Fallujah; we threatened Moqtada al Sadr and then allowed his rise; we left undisturbed the terrorist camps in Eastern Syria from which insurgents were infiltrated into Iraq; and we have merely complained about Iranian support for terror. Seriously frightening our enemies is the sine qua non of any new Iraq policy -- including even that of the ISG report. And the longer we delay it, the more terrible our actions will need to be.

BC: Do you have another book planned? Do you think you'll ever retire?

O'Sullivan: I'm not a great planner. Most of the good things that have happened to me have come out of the blue. That said, I have a general interest in writing another book -- and also in writing something outside my usual range of journalism and political history. It would probably be tempting fate to say more.

I doubt if I shall ever retire -- though I may be forcibly retired by editors and publishers. Journalists can look forward to one of two obituaries: a favorable one "Always Consistent, Never Predictable" (which Colin Welch coined and which he certainly deserves), and an unfavorable one, "Forgotten But Not Gone." On the whole I would prefer the second since it's the only epitaph erected over a living person.

topics:
Abortion, Environment, Law, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Communism, Conservatism, Neoconservatism