James Baker is known for being from the “realist” school of
foreign policy, but if the Iraq Study Group’s report is any
indication, he’s about as much of a realist as Baron Munchhausen.
Munchausen was an 18th century German aristocrat famous for
telling tall tales about such feats as riding cannonballs and
traveling to the moon. Baker, meanwhile, used the Iraq Study
Group’s report as a forum to recount tall tales about when he ended
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Okay, not quite. But that’s what one would be led to believe by
the report’s nostalgic references to Baker’s diplomatic efforts in
the Middle East following the first Gulf War. The commission, in a
complete non sequitur, recommends that the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian
peace process of the early 1990s should be the model for a broader
diplomatic effort to persuade Iraq’s neighbors (including Iran and
Syria) to help bring peace and stability to the war-torn
nation.
Specifically, the report proposes a series of meetings “to
negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid Conference in 1991”
(which Baker organized when he was Secretary of State). These
meetings, overseen by the international community, would be
“between Israel and Lebanon and Syria on the one hand, and Israel
and Palestinians (who acknowledge Israel’s right to exist) on the
other.” The fact that such a parenthetical statement is needed says
it all.
It’s pure fantasy to believe that Israel could negotiate a
settlement with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that would not
be subject to the veto of Hamas, which can derail talks either
through terrorism or the exercising of political power it gained
after its substantial election victory earlier this year. Back in
1991, Israel agreed to the Madrid meetings under the condition that
no representatives of the PLO would be present, but the Palestinian
delegation got around this by bringing an “advisor” who was in
constant contact with the terrorist group, which ran the show from
behind the scenes. Hamas, meanwhile, helped disrupt the talks in
December 1992 by kidnapping and murdering an Israeli border
policeman on the fifth anniversary of the start of the first
intifada.
But the report’s magical thinking does not end there. It
recommends negotiating a settlement in which Syria agrees to small
details such as: helping convince Hamas to acknowledge Israel’s
right to exist, ending its meddling in Lebanon and its aid to
Hezbollah, fully cooperating with investigations into political
assassinations in Lebanon and blocking Iran from using Syrian
territory to transport weapons to Hezbollah.
Israel, meanwhile, will be expected to return the Golan Heights
to Syria as part of a larger “land for peace” deal in the spirit of
United Nations Resolution 242. The problem is
that the resolution was passed in the wake of the 1967 war and its
meaning has been debated ever since. Palestinians believe it means
Israel should return to its pre-1967 borders, Israelis believe it
means they can keep some territory captured during the Six Day War
to maintain defensible borders. Whatever one’s position on this
debate, it’s unlikely that after nearly 40 years of fighting and
diplomacy, the issue will be resolved in time to make a difference
in Iraq.
But even if, by some miracle, the Arab-Israeli conflict were
resolved tomorrow, it’s hard to see how that would have any impact
on what is going on inside Iraq. According to the report, sectarian
violence between the Sunni insurgency and Shiite militias “has
become the principal challenge to stability” and “causes the
largest number of civilian casualties.” Al Qaeda wants to instigate
the sectarian war and drive the U.S. out of Iraq. Regional players
such as Iran and Syria, meanwhile, want to gain influence over
different regions of the country. If peace were achieved between
Israel and the Palestinians, would Sunnis suddenly be content to be
in the minority? Would Syrians and Iranians have less interest in
gaining power in Iraq?
In addition to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
commission suggests other “possible incentives” to win over Iran
and Syria. Among them are: “The continuing role of the United
States in preventing the Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan.”
To be considered an incentive, a party has to receive something it
otherwise would not have. It’s hard to imagine Iran’s leaders
living in fear that the U.S. may stop fighting the Taliban. Other
incentives include entrance into the World Trade Organization and
“enhanced diplomatic relations with the United States.” However,
the report also says that negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program
should be conducted separately, along the path they are proceeding
down now. If that’s the case, why should the U.S. use all of its
bargaining chips on getting Iran to cooperate on Iraq?
Of course, it’s ridiculous to expect Iran to cooperate with the
U.S. on Iraq when our interests are diametrically opposed. In the
report, the commission argues repeatedly that a chaotic Iraq is not
in Iran’s interest. But were Iran to help stabilize Iraq, it would
only do so in exchange for extending its own power and influence —
not to help America build a democracy. Just last week, when Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani crawled to Iran for help, Iran’s supreme leader
Ali Khamenei said that U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was a prerequisite
to securing the country.
The Iraq Study Group’s report does acknowledge that “Our limited
contacts with Iran’s government lead us to believe that its leaders
are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic efforts
to support stability in Iraq,” but that does not prevent the
commission from concluding that “as one of Iraq’s neighbors Iran
should be asked to assume its responsibility…”
If this is what “realism” looks like, I’d prefer to pin my hopes
on Santa Claus coming to Baghdad this Christmas and bringing peace
and joy to the world.
