The American Spectator

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11.1.06 @ 12:01AM

(Page 5 of 5)

Until conservative, technically qualified individuals -- and there are many -- get a chance to weigh in on this subject and are given a respectful hearing, the present global warming cacophony should be recognized for what it is. A group of aspiring totalitarians yelling "fire" in a crowded theater.
-- Edward Costello
Bellevue, Washington

SHOT DOWN
Re: Hal G.P. Colebatch's reply (under "'Roo the Day") in Reader Mail's Boomer Fizzles:

Hal G.P. Colebatch wrote:

The point is that the Canberra was designed to be part of a British Commonwealth strike force with Australia playing a big part. It was to be based in Australia, initial tests were carried out in Australia, and the project was supported by the Australian Government, which put in an initial order for 48, to be Australian-built. Details are given in the book Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb, by Dr. Wayne Reynolds, Senior Lecturer in History at Newcastle University (Melbourne University Press, 2000), pages 79-81.

There's only one problem with this hypothesis: it's almost entirely wrong. The Canberra was indeed developed by the English Electric Company (now part of BAE), and it was adopted by the U.S. military as the Martin B-57. But it was never intended for a nuclear strike role, being a short-range tactical bomber intended to replace the de Haviland Mosquito light bomber/reconnaissance aircraft. It was never equipped to deliver nuclear weapons, nor could it have done so even if the Australians had so desired, since the nuclear weapons of the era were larger than the aircraft's bomb bay could accommodate. The British nuclear strike force was based around the so-called "V-Bombers" (Vulcan, Victor and Valiant), which had roughly the size and performance of its American contemporary the B-47 Stratojet. "V-bombers" were never offered to any member of the Commonwealth, nor, given the production delays and cost overruns in the program, would any have been available.

Moreover, while some operational testing of the Canberra may have taken place in Australia, in fact the bulk of the flight testing took place at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Boscombe Downs. It was not unusual at the time for all Commonwealth countries to employ British aircraft, as its pilots and aircrew had been trained for the most part on RAF aircraft to RAF standards. Internal economic deals also made British aircraft economically attractive to Commonwealth members. Thus, while the Australian Air Force in the 1950s license-produced the North American F-86 Sabre, this was due only to the delay in delivery of the British Hawker Hunter. It was not until collapse of the British military aircraft industry in the 1960s (a result of a the 1950 Defense White Paper that declared aircraft to be obsolete) that U.S. aircraft began making significant inroads in the Commonwealth inventories (and indeed, in the RAF itself). Thus, Australia remains the last user of the magnificent F-111 strike fighter, while the RAF used a variant of the Phantom for nearly two decades.
-- Stuart Koehl
Falls Church, Virginia

Hal G.P. Colebatch replies:
My own sources are quite at variance with this. Certainly, far from being a "short-range tactical bomber," the Canberra was for its day spectacularly long-ranged. It was used by the U.S. as a long-range intruder aircraft.

I agree it was in fact assigned the role of a tactical bomber, but this was not necessarily the original intention. There seems no reason it could not have eventually carried nuclear weapons except that times, nuclear technology, alliance arrangements and strategic needs changed. It had a bomb-capacity of 10,000 pounds, the weight of an atomic bomb, and was designed to fly above 40,000 feet, suggesting a strategic rather than a tactical role.

On September 12, 1956, Australian Defense Minister Athol Townley complained that the Canberra did not carry enough conventional bombs to take an appropriate part in the Strategic Reserve but that "it can carry nuclear weapons." With this in mind, the Australian Defense committee agreed to approach the UK about acquiring nuclear weapons. The upheaval of the Suez crisis may have had something to do with this project going no further.

Further, according to Reynolds: "Declassified records reveal that information was sent to Australian between November 1959 and December 1960 on the feasibility of equipping RAAF Canberras with the USAF Mark 7 atomic bombs, along with copies of US aircrew weapons delivery manuals and 'maintenance instructions for special stores.'" (source: "Study, Feasibility of Equipping RAAF Canberra MK 20 Bomber Aircraft for Combat Delivery of USAF MK 7 Nuclear Bombs, 3 MEL-10, R190/10, A6456/2, AA," Quoted in Reynolds at p. 250).

I said in my original article simply that there was some evidence Australia looked to developing a nuclear deterrent in the late 1940s or early '50s but this was not proceeded with. It would have been possible to elaborate further -- this would have been a joint British Commonwealth effort with Britain taking a leading role and references to this effect are on the public record -- but this was a passing reference in an article making another point entirely. The whole thing is really very hypothetical and a periferal issue to what I was saying, which is that Australia is a very solid U.S. ally. The Royal Australian Air Force now flies F-18 fighters as well as F-111s and will probably buy Raptors.

LOST IN TRANSLATION
Re: James Bowman's Immanuel Kant for Dummies:

Since it is imperative that we view North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions with such categorical equanimity as we can muster, I wonder what Mr. Bowman makes of Naval Postgraduate School professor Vali Nasr's recent observation that Kant has become the most translated Western philosopher in Persia?
-- Russell Seitz
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Letter to the Editor

topics:
Health Care, Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Religion, Islam, Abortion, Environment, Global Warming, Law, Military, Iraq, Iran, NATO, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Medicare