Abu Abbas, head of the Palestine Liberation Front, was captured
in Iraq shortly after the fall of Baghdad and died of natural
causes in U.S. custody the following year. Notorious for the 1985
hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Abbas’s most deadly
terrorist attack actually occurred in 1974, when a PLF assault in
northern Israel killed 36 people. Abbas was also behind a foiled
attack on a Tel Aviv beach in May 1990, when the U.S. was first
trying to establish a dialogue with the PLO. Abbas’s assault
interfered with those efforts, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait two
months later halted them. Yet they were vigorously renewed after
the war with Iraq, leading to the 1993 Oslo accords and eight
years in which the diplomacy known as the “peace process” became
the central U.S. preoccupation in the Middle East
A newly released Iraqi
document, translated here,
details Abbas’s links to the regime of Saddam Hussein and
provides some indication of just why that diplomacy was so
wrong-headed. Many Americans now think of Islamic extremists as
the only terrorists in the Middle East, yet Yassir Arafat and his
“secular” cronies never gave up terrorism, and Iraq was part of
that axis. Since September 2000, when Arafat launched the second
Palestinian uprising, over 1,000 Israelis were killed in
terrorist attacks — more than in the previous three decades
combined.
The Abu Abbas Document
The Iraqi document, consisting of a series of memos written
between December 1991 and February 1992, starts with a note from
the Revolutionary Command Council, written by Abdul Rahman
Mahmoud, director of the Palestine Branch in the RCC’s Office of
Arab Liberation Movements. Mahmoud writes that the United States
is managing to sustain support in the U.N. Security Council for
maintaining sanctions on Iraq by using various issues: chemical
and nuclear weapons, democracy, and the Kurds. He observes that
although the United States has not yet done so, Washington might
use “the backing of Iraq for terrorism, as they call it, and its
harboring of terrorist elements and the relationship that was
renewed with some groups during the Mother of Battles’ [i.e., the
1991 Gulf War]”
Mahmoud singles out Abu Abbas as a particular vulnerability and
suggests that Abbas leave Iraq for a tour of several Arab states
— Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, and Sudan. When Abbas returns to Iraq
— which would have to be through Jordan, given the siege on Iraq
— he should use another passport and pose as an Iraqi to create
the impression that he had left Baghdad for good. Abbas would
then live in a safehouse maintained by the Iraqi Intelligence
Service, without the knowledge of his family or his group, as
Jordanian intelligence had penetrated the PLF.
The proposal was approved and discussed with Abbas. He was
agreeable (he could scarcely afford to be otherwise), although he
asked for time to prepare his journey, and it was decided to get
Saddam’s agreement to the move. Saddam, however, determined that
it was unnecessary even to go through the motions of pretending
Iraq no longer harbored Abbas. “Delayed: no pressing necessity
seen” was the final decision, issued on February 19, 1992, ending
this series of memos.
Terrorism and the “Peace Process”
It is very hard now to recall the euphoria surrounding the
Arab-Israeli “peace process.” Following the Oslo accord, many
believed Israel was about to conclude a comprehensive peace with
the Arabs; this included not only Americans, but Israelis, Labor
as well as Likud. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the Arabs
no choice but to come to terms with Israel, since it had the
support of the sole remaining superpower, or so it was claimed.
All rational figures, essentially, those who were “secular,”
including Arafat and Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad, recognized
this reality; the exception was religious zealots.
Thus, Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin divided the Middle East into
the “partners for peace,” and the “enemies of peace,” the Islamic
extremists. As Rabin affirmed,
Even Syria and Lebanon, the governments there with which we
negotiate are those who support peace….The enemies of peace are
the members of the movements and the organizations that belong to
the wave of extremism, fundamentalist terrorist Islamic
movements….They are the enemies of peace and in their lead is
Iran.
Yet even as Rabin spoke, Syria maintained close ties with Iran,
supported Hizbollah in Lebanon, as well as the Palestinian
Islamic organizations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad — just as it does
today. The sharp division that Rabin attributed to the “partners
for peace” and “the enemies of peace” did not exist, nor did any
sharp division exist between “secular” entities in the region and
Islamic ones.
In the context of the “peace process,” Abu Abbas became an
acceptable figure. In 1996, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres
allowed Abbas to visit Gaza to attend a meeting of the Palestine
National Council. The U.S. Senate voted 99 to 0 that Abbas should
be extradited to stand trial here, although it lacked authority
to enforce its vote. In 1998, when Benjamin Netanyahu was Prime
Minister, Abbas was actually allowed to open an office in Gaza,
even as he maintained a residence in Baghdad. Some outraged
Israelis sought to have Abbas extradited to Israel, but were
rebuffed by Israel’s High Court of Justice.
After Arafat launched the second uprising in 2000, Abbas, in
Baghdad, promised to carry out “big suicide operations.” The
Iraqi regime announced it would open training camps for
volunteers to support the intifadah and began paying $10,000 to
the families of suicide bombers (this sum was later raised to
$25,000).
In April 2003, U.S. Marines captured a terrorist training camp,
run jointly by the PLF and the Iraqi regime. Chemicals and
bomb-making facilities were found at the 20-building complex east
of Baghdad. Also discovered were questionnaires in which recruits
were asked to choose their assignments. “Suicide mission” was the
choice of many, a Marine spokesman explained.
