By Matthew Omolesky on 7.18.06 @ 12:07AM
Necessity, proportionality, and the military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon.
Hugo Grotius, the 17th century jurist and father of public
international law, stated in his 1625 magnum opus The Rights of
War and Peace that "Most Men assign three just Causes
of War, Defense, the Recovery of what's our own,
and Punishment." Using Grotius' criteria, Israel's recent
use of force against Hamas and Hezbollah can be considered trebly
justified, given that it seeks to defend itself from enemy
incursions, recover its kidnapped citizens, and ensure that such
invasions are not repeated. Yet the French Foreign Ministry
announced that "France deplores Israel's bombardments on a beach in
the Gaza Strip, whose disproportionate character has cost the lives
of several civilians and injured many others," while the European
Union chided Israel for "the disproportionate use of force by
Israel in Lebanon in response to attacks by Hezbollah on Israel,"
and Egypt claimed that "Israel's disproportionate use of power in a
densely populated area contradicts international law." These
criticisms shift the debate from whether a response from Israel is
justified to whether Israel's current response is "proportionate,"
a term with a long history in international law and a term all too
often abused.
It is confusing that a military operation should adhere to
principles of proportionality in the first place. After all,
military commanders are hardly obligated to fire as many bullets as
the enemy and no more. Any confrontation between Israel and Hamas
or Hezbollah will perforce be out of proportion; the former has
F-16s, the latter crude rockets and suicide belts. (One recalls
decades-old municipal legal rulings in the United States, now
considered misguided, that a homeowner using a firearm against a
knife-wielding attacker was guilty of a criminal offense due to the
disproportionate force involved.) But according to
generally-accepted public international law, proportionality,
together with necessity, are the two limitations to the inherent
national right of self-defense.
To understand "necessity," we can look to the famous
Caroline Dispute of 1841, in which Daniel Webster
complained to the British government that British soldiers had
captured a private American ship, set it ablaze, and then sent it
over Niagara Falls, on the grounds that the ship had been supplying
Canadian rebels. According the Caroline dictum, "the
necessity of self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The doctrine of
"proportionality" arose out of the ancient practice of reprisal or
retorsion. In a 1928 trial (the Naulilaa case) involving
an instance of retaliation by German colonial soldiers against a
Portuguese outpost that had accidentally fired on a German
interpreter, the Special Arbitral Tribunal defined reprisal as "an
act of self-help on the part of an injured state -- after an
unsatisfied demand -- responding to an act contrary to the law
of nations on the part of the offending state." Since this
definition alone did not require that a response be proportionate,
the court ruled that international law, in order to prohibit
excess, "seems to restrict the notion of legitimate reprisal."
The United Nations Charter acknowledges the "inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense," although states undertaking
such an exercise are in theory obligated to inform the Security
Council under the terms of Article 51. According to the jurist
Louis Henkin, "It has...been accepted that the right to
self-defense, individual or collective, is subject to limitations
of 'necessity' and 'proportionality,' but that self-defense
includes a right both to repel armed attack and to take the war to
the aggressor state in order effectively to terminate the attack
and prevent a recurrence." Here, we are not so far from Grotius'
justifications of defense, recovery, and punishment. Another
jurist, W. Michael Reisman, has found nine categories that allow
for the legal use of unilateral force, including self-defense and
"counter-measures such as reprisals and retorsions."
This, then, is the current state of international law concerning
the use of force. Do Israel's actions stand up to the
Caroline dictum? The necessity is indeed "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation," if one considers the dangers posed by terrorist
raids into one's territory, and the potentiality of kidnapped
soldiers being spirited away to Iran, as has been suggested. Do
Israel's actions stand up to the Naulilaa criteria? There
is an unsatisfied demand (the return of kidnapped soldiers), and
the response may be said to be proportionate to the threat posed by
Hamas and Hezbollah, if not proportionate to the specific means
used against them. Israeli Defense Force operations in Gaza and
Lebanon also meet the criteria laid out by Henkin and Reisman for
the legal exercises of unilateral force in self-defense. To say
that Israel has somehow contradicted the international law of war
is to pretend that international law is something else
entirely.
In any case, it is distinctly ironic for French President
Jacques Chirac to condemn Israel for a disproportionate response,
given events less than two years ago in Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory
Coast). On November 5, 2004, Cote d'Ivoire government helicopters
strafed a rebel village, accidentally killing nine French
peacekeepers. Did France adhere to the Naulilaa principles
and make an official demand which, if unmet, would result in a
proportional response? No. France retaliated by destroying the
entire Cote d'Ivorien air force, sparking widespread protests and
mob violence in the streets of Abidjan. I do not recall a single
statement by members of the international community regarding the
disproportionate use of force by the French military in this
instance, yet Israel's actions, prompted by the enormities
committed by powerful non-state terrorist actors on Israeli
territory, and justified by Grotius's rule, the Caroline
rule, the Naulilaa rule, and current international
customary law, is deprecated in the harshest terms. The recent
comments made by various national governments and international
organizations regarding Israeli military "disproportionality"
represent a disturbing example of the false invocation of
international law to buttress particular policy biases, and should
be rejected as such.
topics:
Law, Military, Iran, Israel, United Nations