By Rensselaer Lee on 7.14.06 @ 12:07AM
Russia's unprotected nukes should be a top item of discussion with His Excellency, Mr. Putin.
When the G-8 leaders meet in Russia this weekend, nuclear
proliferation will be high on the agenda. While much of the focus
will be on Iran and North Korea, President Bush should raise
another key issue with Vladimir Putin: the continued security (or
lack thereof) of Russia's nuclear materials and expertise. A recent
Council on Foreign Relations report calls Russia's commitment to
non-proliferation into question. In light of Moscow's cozy nuclear
relations with Iran and the tendency of some Russian officials to
downplay the threat of nuclear theft, it is well past time to
address these issues and ensure that nuclear materials do not fall
into the wrong hands.
The chief obstacle is not a lack of money, at least on the
American side. As of 2005, the United States was spending almost $1
billion a year on overseas nuclear security and related disarmament
projects, with most of the funds being directed towards Russia.
Washington's efforts to counter nuclear theft in Russia have
focused largely on strengthening security at nuclear facilities,
deploying technological monitoring equipment at key border
crossings, and checking the dissemination of militarily significant
know-how.
Yet serious security gaps still exist, most noticeably in the
realm of Russian personnel. Background checks and monitoring of
scientists and security guards at nuclear facilities is extremely
lax, and this gap could allow well-funded and determined black
marketers and terrorist groups to procure weapons-grade material.
Russian and U.S. experts agree that a successful theft can be
pulled off with four to five insiders at most. According to Matthew
Bunn of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University,
"once stolen material is removed from authorized control, much of
the battle is already lost...finding stolen material within a
country, or detecting and interdicting its passage across borders,
are Herculean tasks." Given that, what has the U.S. government done
to bolster this security? Not enough.
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program
(MPC&A), Washington's plan to prevent nuclear theft, fails to
address these personnel issues properly. The program attempts to
instill a "culture of security" into the Russian nuclear community,
but has no stipulations for deterring criminally inclined insiders.
Instead of creating extensive monitoring systems that would raise
the risks of stealing nuclear materials, the program merely tries
to teach scientists how to follow norms and procedures. Even if
these programs were appropriately targeted, their timeframes leave
us vulnerable: goals projected in the Department of Energy's 2007
budget include securing 350 border crossings by 2012 and creating
11,000 private sector jobs for displaced scientists by 2019. 13
years to allow terrorists to pilfer Russia's nuclear materials is
far too long.
The U.S. and Russia need to address these personnel issues
cooperatively. This approach would create "vulnerability profiles"
of every Russian facility that works with nuclear materials.
Profiles could be based on economic conditions, wage scales, and
the presence of organized crime and terrorist groups. It would also
be possible, with U.S. cooperation, to gauge the susceptibility of
the workforce to bribes or blackmail, with drug use, gambling, and
conspicuous consumption as warning signs.
Such a system would be expensive to implement, and to date, the
Russians have been unwilling to provide the required funds. This is
where the U.S. role would be key. We could redirect funds toward
this system, while at the same time using our own security
processing experience to help the Russians create a robust defense
against nuclear theft. Further, we should enlist other G-8 nations
that share a vested interest in ensuring that these materials do
not fall into the wrong hands. A $500 million MPC&A fund would
include U.S. funds transferred from less worthy projects and
investments by other G-8 members. But without Russian cooperation,
our efforts will bear no fruit, so we should engage Russia and
secure its support, both for this proposal and for fighting nuclear
proliferation in general.
Time is not on our side. The longer Russian nuclear materials
are unprotected, the more time terrorists and black marketers will
have to procure them. We should use the G-8 meeting to take
tangible steps to end this threat and make the United States more
secure.
topics:
Vladimir Putin, Iran, Russia, North Korea, Energy
