Outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is making
what is expected to be his last official visit to the U.S. Besides
visiting Elvis Presley’s Graceland, the Elvis-fan Koizumi is likely
to discuss ideas for increased security cooperation in Northeast
Asia.
Koizumi, who pointedly said that he would not be viewing Michael
Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, has become one of President
George W. Bush’s favorite allies. Yet what Tokyo has most to offer
is abundant military capabilities leavened by an interest in
maintaining regional stability, which should allow the U.S. to step
back and focus on challenges elsewhere around the globe.
Japan will soon bring home its forces from Iraq. The only people
who are likely to notice are the Australians, since they’ve been
guarding the Japanese “soldiers.” Notes Australian Prime Minister
John Howard, his nation’s troops will keep “looking after the
Japanese until the Japanese have gone, and I expect that to be
quite soon.”
This operation would have been a bad joke if it had involved any
other country. In December 2003 Tokyo decided to send 550 military
personnel to Iraq to provide “humanitarian” assistance, so they
were not allowed to defend themselves. The soldiers were stationed
in the reasonably peaceful city of Samawah, and were confined to
their base if anything untoward happened in the surrounding
community. Moreover, first the Dutch and then the Australians
deployed soldiers to guard the Japanese “soldiers.”
In terms of securing Iraq, the mission obviously was a bust,
actually wasting military forces that should have been employed
elsewhere. Indeed, Canberra plans on moving its 460 soldiers to
guard the Iraq-Syria border, a far more important task than
protecting soldiers who don’t fight.
Still, the Japanese seem pleased with themselves. The
humanitarian mission “has achieved its mission,” insists Prime
Minister Koizumi. (A cursory survey of Iraq suggests that there is
a bit more work to do in this regard, but never mind.) Foreign
Minister Taro Aso preened cheerfully: “I think such views [of
Japanese professionalism] have made a very big contribution to
improving the brand image of Japan as a country.”
In fact, Tokyo went along with the U.S. in Iraq — despite
popular opposition to the war — largely to protect its security
ties with America. Admitted the Prime Minister: “Japan’s policy to
cooperate with the United States based on the importance of the
Japan-US alliance has never changed and will not change.” That is,
Japan recognized that it would be hard to get Washington to
continue underwriting the security of the wealthy island nation
with the world’s second-largest economy if it wasn’t willing to
help Washington when the latter came calling.
This relationship might make sense for Tokyo, but the benefit
for the U.S. is less obvious. Receiving the temporary assistance of
550 Japanese “humanitarian” soldiers is a poor trade for the
permanent garrisoning of 40,000 troops in Japan. Better would be
for Tokyo to take on responsibility for its own defense as well as
regional stability, freeing up U.S. military units for better use
elsewhere.
THUS, JAPAN’S PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ will have long-term value for
America only if it spurs further reevaluation of Japan’s role in
the world. Six decades after World War II Japan is still distrusted
by her neighbors, criticized for failing to fully acknowledge her
past misdeeds, and enmeshed in controversy over the textbooks used
by her schools. Opposition to a more active Japanese foreign policy
may have abated somewhat in the region, but neither South Korea nor
China, in particular, are prepared to forgive and forget.
Yet Tokyo feels ever less comfortable acting as a military
junior in America’s shadow. Although China’s future direction is
impossible to predict with any precision, Beijing seems bound to
reach for regional dominance. This prospect fills Japan with
disquiet. Foreign Minister Aso says that China is becoming “a
considerable threat.”
Perhaps even more ominous is truculent North Korea. After
Pyongyang’s 1998 missile launch, Japan realized that it was a
convenient target of blackmail and retaliation. Tokyo is in the
unpleasant situation of being so tied to Washington as to be a
natural target yet so dependent on Washington as to be ill-prepared
to defend itself.
Japan has responded by reaffirming its relationship with the
U.S. Notes Koji Murata, an international relations professor at
Doshishia University: “Japanese people are getting more and more
realistic and think we have to sustain the military relationship
with the U.S.” After the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
met last fall, the Japanese embassy announced: “The two countries
also concurred that persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific
region, such as North Korea, engender uncertainty and
unpredictability, underscoring the need to pay cautious attention
to the modernization of military capabilities in the region.”
More significantly, Tokyo also has begun to reassess its foreign
and defense policies. In October 2001 the Japanese Diet enacted
legislation allowing the dispatch of naval vessels to help refuel
coalition ships engaged in the operation in Afghanistan. Two years
later the legislature approved the dispatch of the non-combatant
“soldiers” to Iraq. (Japan also pledged $5 billion in aid for Iraq,
but that reflected Tokyo’s traditional strategy of emphasizing
economic influence.)
Japan has pointed to Chinese naval activities in its annual
defense “white paper” and indicated its concern over potential
conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, Japan even placed a
moratorium on financial aid to China. Although Japan recently
lifted the restriction, it suggested that Tokyo was less willing to
turn the other cheek in the face of international provocation.
There also is popular support for tougher action against North
Korea. The emotional response to Pyongyang’s kidnapping of Japanese
citizens has unhelpfully diverted attention from more serious
security issues, particularly the North Korean nuclear program and
missile developments. But popular pressure has encouraged the Diet
to empower the cabinet to unilaterally impose economic
sanctions.
Tokyo’s growing assertiveness has not gone without controversy,
even in the U.S. American officials once talked about the U.S.
military presence as a “cap in the bottle” to contain Japanese
nationalism. Analysts ranging from the Clinton administration to
the neoconservative Project for the New American Century have
opposed transferring military responsibilities to Tokyo. Eugene
Matthews, then of the Council on Foreign Relations, warned of “the
rise of a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan, which
would be a nightmare for the country’s neighbors.”
Yet such fears are short-sighted. Japan is not about to embark
upon another imperialist rampage throughout East Asia. Nor does the
U.S. possess sufficient resources to fulfill its manifold security
responsibilities around the globe as well as underwrite the
ever-lengthening line of international welfare queens whose primary
goal is to clamber onto the American military dole.
OF COURSE, THE POTENTIAL THREATS PERCEIVED by Tokyo also animate
some American officials to support a continued U.S. presence.
Opines Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, the American commander in Japan: “You
just have to take a look around the region to see why it is so
important. The size of the militaries, and in fact the growing
military capabilities in this region, certainly gets my
attention.”
But these growing militaries are precisely the reason Washington
should step back and allow its friends to take on primary
responsibility for regional security. Japan possesses a sizable
modern military, with substantial anti-submarine and mine-clearing
capabilities, for instance. Its defense outlays, which could be
increased greatly, already place it among the top spenders and
enable it to build a military capable of deterring China, in
particular.
The Republic of Korea, and especially a united Korea, also could
become a much more substantial player. Australia already has taken
on significant regional responsibilities. A rapidly growing India
is likely to become a more important, and likely positive, force in
regional security developments.
Of course, it is up to these countries to choose their own
defense policies. Japan faces the unique challenge of dealing with
Article 9 of its constitution, which formally bars the maintenance
of “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential.” But
all of them should be made to understand that the U.S. will no
longer make it easy for them to avoid taking on responsibility for
protecting their own interests.
The end of Tokyo’s participation in the Iraq coalition will have
no practical impact. But Japan’s withdrawal provides the Bush
administration with an opportunity to refashion the bilateral
alliance. Notes Chris Preble of the Cato Institute: “A new
strategic relationship should provide a more durable and credible
foundation for addressing the most pressing security challenges
facing both countries in East Asia and beyond.” America and the
free world more generally will benefit of Japan takes on a larger
foreign policy role.
