A new report with the provocative headline “Al Qaeda: The Next
Phase of Evolution?” warns that the torch has been passed to a new
style of terrorist network, one with little in common with the
bumpkins that botched the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. The
report, authored by Stratfor’s Fred Burton, warns of the emergence
of a “grassroots jihadist network that both exists in, and has the
ability to strike in multiple countries — without support or
oversight from the central al Qaeda leadership.” In other words,
after years of dodging in and out of the Tora Bora caves, Osama bin
Laden has become obsolete. Where once bin Laden ran al Qaeda like
some Don Corleone wannabe, and his hand-picked apprentices were
trained in Bin Laden’s Afghan Training Camp and Spa, the new al
Qaeda is more akin to the leaderless anarchist groups that blew
onto the international scene in the late 19th century. It not only
lacks Osama’s quiet wisdom and guiding hand, but is younger,
dumber, and motivated by factors quite distinct from those of its
predecessor.
Over its nearly two-decade career, al Qaeda has proved highly
adaptable, changing its modus operandi no fewer than four times
since its attacks commenced in the early '90s. Indeed, the
terrorists are now finding it necessary to change their operational
model after every significant attack. The result is that the
jihadists are able to stay one-step ahead of the West’s bumbling
security services, who have had a rather trying time predicting
future models of attack.
The change was inevitable, and a long-time coming. Following the
invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda lost its key infrastructure,
including its government support, its headquarters, training camps,
you name it. Since then bin Laden has been on the lam and hardly in
a position to lead a global jihad. Instead, he is now seen more as
a fund-raising figurehead. Today, the Internet has replaced bin
Laden as a magnet around which to “pull together the shattered
remains of the organization that operated before the invasion of
Afghanistan,” Lt. Gen John Abizaid tells the BBC.
In 1996 a British gent named Babar Ahmad pioneered al Qaeda
Online (a lovely site that showed beheadings, kidnapped victims’
pleas and served as a fundraising mechanism for terror groups) from
his comfy office at Imperial College in London. (My, terrorists do
seem to have a strong affinity for Western universities.) U.S.
prosecutors say they can link Ahmad to the Taliban and Shamil
Basayev, the Chechen terrorist behind the Beslan school attack. He
has since run for a seat in the British parliament, and, from
behind the walls of a British prison, established another website to
spread his anti-American tosh, while he fights extradition to the
U.S.
TODAY’S AL QAEDA has turned from employing sleepers and foreign
students to recruiting young, homegrown, locally radicalized
Muslims, as in the London bombings, and the Egyptian and Saudi
Arabia attacks. “Previously, such a feat could only have been
accomplished by the core al Qaeda organization,” the report notes.
“For a grassroots network to accomplish that feat, without direct
involvement from the central leadership, would represent a
generational leap forward in jihadist operations.”
The Canada 17’s pre-empted attacks would have featured this new
model. Here was a well-connected cell, part of an international
network with links to jihadists in the U.S. and Britain.
Significantly, the new al Qaeda sympathizers have moved their base
of operations to Canada, which has more liberal immigration and
asylum policies than the U.S. (if such is possible), and avoids the
interference of that meddlesome Patriot Act.
The new al Qaeda, however, has an agenda far different from that
of its predecessors, who were radicalized while beating up on the
Red Army in Afghanistan, and sought nothing less than the
restoration of the Islamic Caliphate. The new jihadist couldn’t
care less about the Caliphate, and has as his motivation anger over
the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and, of course, the
Israel-Palestinian dispute.
Al Qaeda may be changing its tactics, but some things remain
disturbingly the same. The U.S.’s ally Pakistan is still home to
terrorist training camps (as are the Philippines and
Palestinian-controlled Gaza). The jihadists are still targeting
symbolic sites and high profile persons. The Canada 17’s targeting
of the Canadian prime minister calls to mind Abdel Basit’s plots to
kill Pope John Paul II and President Bill Clinton. The terrorists
continue to utilize low-tech, indigenous materials, like ammonium
nitrate, which Timothy McVeigh used in the Oklahoma City bombing.
Thus al Qaeda can avoid the risk of smuggling weapons into a target
country, using whatever’s available, whether that be jets,
fertilizer or the Spanish-made explosives used in the Madrid
attacks.
The new al Qaeda is clever, ruthless and slippery, but not
necessarily bright and well organized. Young jihadists seem to have
no reservations about using Internet chat rooms, which make it
rather easy to track them. (Fortunately it is still legal for the
FBI to log onto jihadist websites.) When contacts of the Canada 17
were rounded up last year, the alleged terrorists stupidly pressed
on with their plans, instead of going underground.
It no longer makes sense to refer to these disparate groups as
al Qaeda, solely because they are sympathetic to a few of the same
objectives as Osama bin Laden. Though I suspect the label will
persist since everyone easily recognizes “al Qaeda” as the bad guy,
and the name has the connotation and weight of “Nazi,” or
“Stalinist” and therefore remains useful, if misleading. The fact
is al Qaeda, as we knew it, is a thing of the past. Today’s
terrorists are simply herds of rogue elephants fighting what they
are convinced is a romantic and holy cause against the infidel.
And, all things considered, they are not doing too badly.
Christopher Orlet is a frequent contributor and runs
the Existential Journalist.
