In June 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency, verifying
claims made by Iranian exiles the previous summer, declared the
Islamic Republic of Iran in violation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. In September 2003, the Bush
administration called for Iran’s referral to the UN Security
Council, but agreed to defer to the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the
UK), who sought to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program by
offering various economic and political concessions. In December
2003, Iran signed an agreement with the EU-3 to suspend uranium
enrichment; in June 2004 Iran was caught in violation of that
agreement by the IAEA. In November 2004, the EU-3 and Iran resumed
negotiations, which led to an agreement with Iran promising again
to suspend enrichment. Then Iran reneged and threatened to withdraw
from the talks unless the EU-3 made various concessions. They made
those concessions. In January 2006, Iran broke the UN seals at its
uranium enrichment plant at Natanz; the EU-3 suspended negotiations
and recommended the matter be referred to the Security Council.
Last month the IAEA concluded it would finally refer the matter to
the Security Council. The Security Council set a deadline of last
Friday for Iran to freeze nuclear enrichment; the IAEA reported
that day that Iran was not complying.
President Bush responded to the report in part by saying that
“diplomacy is just beginning.”
It could not be clearer that the Bush administration is loath to
resort to military action against Iran until it is absolutely,
positively, the only option remaining. The good news is that
there’s still time to stall: President Ahmadinejad’s boasts
notwithstanding, Iran is years away from building a nuclear
warhead. One advantage to the EU-3’s diplomatic push is that it has
demonstrated that our intelligence about the Iranian nuclear
program is pretty good; if the mullahs had major undiscovered
facilities secretly producing fissionable material somewhere, or
even a serious prospect of buying such material in sufficient
quantities, their behavior at the negotiating table would make no
sense.
While we’re stalling, there are some things we can do to
encourage the regime change that must be the goal of U.S. policy
toward Iran. The UN Security Council will meet this week to discuss
sanctions. The problem is that the Russians and Chinese are sure to
veto any regime of economic sanctions with sufficient bite to
intimidate Tehran. But there just might be a shot at targeted
sanctions to symbolically emphasize the isolating effect of Iranian
belligerence. Bans on international sporting competition heavily
influenced public opinion in both Serbia and South Africa, and
keeping Iran out of the World Cup this summer would drive home to
soccer fans in the Islamic Republic which way their leaders are
steering their country.
We can also encourage regime change with a mixture of overt and
covert campaign to support anti-regime elements within Iran. The
$75 million that Secretary Rice has requested from Congress to
encourage democracy in Iran is a good first step, but only a first
step.
But we should be wary of overestimating the odds of regime
change from within preceding the Islamic Republic’s completion of
nuclear arms. And once the mullahs have the bomb, they will have a
free hand to ramp up violent repression of their internal
opposition without fear of triggering intervention from without. We
can’t afford to allow a regime as dangerous as Iran’s go nuclear.
Aerial bombardment of Iran’s nuclear facilities is a risky
proposition; such a campaign could cause advantageous political
convulsions within Iran, but could also lead to escalation that
ultimately necessitates a ground invasion. It is, however, a risky
proposition that we must prepare for in the coming years, for it is
clearly less risky than relying on classical nuclear deterrence
against men who believe they have a holy duty to kill us.
