The case of Abdul Rahman, the Afghan convert to Christianity,
illustrates the pitfalls of emphasizing Wilsonian humanitarianism
over vital security interests in American defense and foreign
policy. Ideas, as they say, have consequences. And the current
rhetoric of democratization as the paramount objective of American
foreign policy has confused the American public, instead of
clarifying for them, what is at stake in Afghanistan.
Americans were justifiably outraged that judicial authorities in
Afghanistan considered executing Rahman for his act of conscience
and are genuinely relieved that he has been spared execution at the
hands of an allied government. They believed that they did not go
to war in that remote region for the purposes of enshrining a
regime of retrograde religious persecution and disregard of human
rights generally. This is not what democratization was supposed to
be.
Unfortunately, most Americans have forgotten that they did not,
in fact, go to war in Afghanistan to promote democracy, liberate
women, promote religious freedom, or for any other humanitarian
purpose. They sent their crack military forces there to destroy the
terrorists responsible for destruction of the World Trade Center on
September 11th and the regime that sheltered and sustained
them.
This historical and political amnesia on the part of our
citizenry may be forgiven them for the reason that the very concept
of a realistic foreign policy and a punitive military response to
terrorism has been overshadowed by incessant rhetoric, emanating
from both liberal and conservative theorists, which portrays
American interventions abroad as rooted in a universal, categorical
imperative to bring democracy American-style to the farthest
reaches of the globe. Overshadowed are the more prosaic reasons of
defending our country against enemies from abroad through their
destruction in detail.
The demands of nation-building in Afghanistan were the
by-product, not the primary objective, of our military and security
mission in that former haven for al Qaeda and their state hosts,
the Taliban.
The exceedingly harsh reality is that, no matter how backward
the current regime, or the entire society for that matter, it is in
our self-interest as Americans to see to it that a stable regime,
aligned with our national interests, remain in power in Afghanistan
so as to avoid creating a vacuum that would allow the Taliban to
return bringing with them al Qaeda.
Indeed, the stabilization of Afghanistan is no sure thing. Some
observers believe that the Taliban will commence a spring offensive
to regain some measure of control at least in the provinces
bordering Pakistan. American soldiers are still being killed there
at an alarming rate. The opium production is accelerating and
promised foreign aid donations are a fraction of what was pledged.
Hamid Karzai is the first popularly elected president, and he is
confronting the dark side of Tocqueville’s “tyranny of the
majority” in the Rahman case.
These trade-offs in the national security interest are not
unprecedented. Roosevelt and Churchill did not think twice about
their strategic partnership of necessity with Stalin to destroy the
immediate scourges of Hitlerism and Nazism. A contemporary example
is our willingness to accord privileges of trade, commerce, and
investment to China which persecutes minorities, religions, and
forces abortions on any couple that might dare to have more than
one child. We tolerate these abuses in order to enjoy the economic
benefits while keeping a watchful geopolitical eye on this rising
power in the world. We count on economic liberalization and a
growing middle class to engender political liberalization in the
long run.
By all means, let us show our outrage over the abuse of
religious freedom evidenced by the theocracy in Afghanistan. Let us
hector them and pressure them with every financial and diplomatic
incentive or disincentive. And let those of us who are Christians
pray that the blood of martyrs will strengthen the Church in its
persecution there.
But, at the end of the day, we need a stable, Muslim Afghan
regime more than it needs us. Absent such a regime, all our blood
and treasure expended in that country will have been for
naught.
The great danger is that the American public might conclude that
we have the luxury of not supporting the current regime in
Afghanistan if horrible incidents, such as the Rahman affair, are
repeated in the future. Given their expectation, taught to them by
numerous leaders, including the President himself, that ours is
first and foremost a mission to bring enlightenment values and
democracy to every land and nation, they may waver in their
commitment to securing their nation’s defense in that far corner of
the world.
In that region our choices are limited and our friends are few.
Pakistan, an “ally” in the war on terrorism, has been an exporter
of technology of mass destruction throughout the world. Our
alliance there depends on one leader, General Pervez Musharaff, the
president, who was educated in Christian schools and has been the
target of several assassination attempts.
The tragedy of Abdul Rahman has crystallized the inherent
conflict between an over-moralizing foreign policy and one that is
grounded in a realistic regard for American national interest. This
is not a conflict between morality and immorality. Rather, it is a
failure to recognize the role of prudence in ordering the affairs
of a great nation that must look to its own interest before it can
attend to those of others.
