Disinformation: 22 Media Myths That Undermine the
War on Terror
by Richard Miniter
(Regnery Publishing, 275 pages, $27.95)
Anyone who believes that Osama bin Laden is on dialysis, that
100,000 Iraqis have been killed in the recent war, or that
Halliburton has reaped huge profits from the Iraq conflict would do
well to consult Richard Miniter’s recent book, Disinformation:
22 Media Myths That Undermine the War on Terror. Instead of
reporting from within the media echo chamber, Miniter (also author
of Losing bin Laden and Shadow War) goes directly
to the most relevant sources to debunk more than a score of
falsehoods about bin Laden, 9/11, and the War on Terrorism.
The most significant myth challenged by this seasoned
investigative journalist is the popular idea that there were no
meaningful connections between Iraq and al Qaeda prior to the 2003
war. Indeed, Miniter devotes four chapters to the meetings, money,
training, and personnel that linked Saddam’s regime to bin Laden’s
terrorist organization. Miniter notes, for example, that one of the
participants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, al Qaeda’s
Abdul Rahman Yasin, not only fled to Iraq after the bombing but
also was given a house and a monthly salary there. Equally
impressive is the author’s description of a full-sized Boeing 707
that sat in an area southeast of Baghdad and served as a training
site for hijackers — among whom were followers of Osama bin Laden.
By the time his four-part analysis is finished, Minister has
provided readers with a host of substantive contacts between Iraq
and al Qaeda.
In another chapter Miniter challenges the popular myth that no
evidence points to Iraq’s pre-war possession of WMD. The author
observes that American forces seized no less than 1.77 metric tons
of enriched uranium in June of 2004, that large supplies of
radioactive powder (suitable for a dirty bomb) were uncovered, and
that 1,500 gallons of chemical agents were found in a Mosul
warehouse. Elsewhere, Miniter offers evidence that cyclosarin,
sarin, and mustard gas were part of Saddam’s arsenal at the time of
the American-led invasion. Finally, Miniter cites authorities on
both sides of the Iraq War debate to show that even opponents of
the war accepted intelligence estimates about Saddam’s WMD’s
programs in March of 2003.
The nightmare scenario of suitcase nukes is a further myth that
Miniter attempts to deflate. Relying on statements from experts,
Miniter concludes that hair-raising tales about misplaced nukes —
stories spread by Russian General Alexander Lebed and Soviet
Colonel Stanislav Lunev — are unfounded. Over against the shifting
tales of Lebed and Lunev, these experts insist that miniaturized
weapons are much larger than advertised, that the weapons were
dismantled pursuant to U.S.-Soviet arms treaties, and that
complicating factors (including the deterioration rate of uranium)
make them almost impossible for terrorists to acquire, transport,
and detonate.
In addition to the critical issues mentioned above, Miniter
deals with several topics that are akin to urban legends. These
mini-myths include the widespread belief that bin Laden requires
dialysis treatment and the claim that Oliver North warned Americans
about the danger of Osama bin Laden during his 1987 Congressional
testimony. (North’s statement, in fact, concerned Abu Nidal.)
Another bit of disinformation, common in the Middle East, is the
claim that no Jews showed up for work at the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001.
To give his work non-partisan appeal, Miniter concludes his list
of 22 with two liberal and two conservative myths. The former
chapters knock down the much-heralded charges that President Bush
called Iraq an “imminent threat” prior to the war and that
Halliburton raked in huge profits from its work in the region. The
latter chapters take on conservative analysts for ideas that aren’t
as easily refuted — certainly not by reviewing Presidential
speeches and corporate financial sheets. These “myths” concern the
beliefs that racial profiling is an effective anti-terrorism tool
and the belief that our border with Mexico poses a significant
terror threat. Ironically, the argument Miniter employs to shoot
down the profiling myth — the likelihood that terrorists will
change their tactics — is ignored when he turns his attention to
the border issue. What Miniter’s analysis in this final chapter
does clearly illustrate is the lax attitude toward terrorists that
has often characterized America’s neighbor to the North.
In a brief epilogue Miniter offers a few suggestions that
address the media’s penchant for reporting and recycling
disinformation. These suggestions, however, only concern
journalistic access to certain government transcripts and ignore
issues like ideological conformity, pack journalism, and the
profound pressure to present news within a dramatic framework.
Overall, Miniter’s work provides solid information about a
number of terror-related issues. Despite the fact that Miniter’s
material comes from generally available sources, only a sliver of
that data has been broadly disseminated by mainstream journalists.
This state of affairs makes Miniter’s myth-busting book extremely
valuable. It also suggests the need for a more comprehensive
analysis of media failings than Miniter himself provides.
