Amid all the New Year’s talk of Putin’s chilly heart, relax. The
same types who are apt to criticize France for styling itself as
far more powerful than it really is bristle when Russia flexes the
occasional muscle to show it can still be taken seriously. As
former great powers, Russia’s weaknesses are more pronounced than
those of France, but its strengths are sharper and more
provocative: the Kremlin can cause a stir without resort to its
veto power at the U.N. Security Council. So arms sales to Syria and
nuclear partnership with Iran have been followed with
next-generation missile testing and now the cutoff of gas supplies
to Ukraine, which significantly impacts gas consumption across
Europe. This track record, showing what some might style
intransigence, is tempered by Russia’s latest announcement — that “it would restore most of
the natural gas that it withheld” from European markets. But the
point has been made — when it comes to energy, Russia can do what
it wants, when it wants.
Should U.S. policymakers be concerned?
Not beyond the level already expressed at State. “Such an abrupt
step,” spokesman Sean McCormack observed, “creates insecurity in the energy
sector in the region and raises serious questions about the use of
energy to exert political pressure.” But questions raised are a
far-off cry from statements made. And the declarations coming out
of Europe express concern controlled by confidence: in Italy (“There’s no reason to be
alarmed,” Eni CEO Scaroni today told Sky Television. “There are
abundant supplies”), Britain (“no big supply deals with Gazprom”),
Germany (“well-prepared” for Ukrainian shutoff), Belgium (“we don’t
import Russian gas”), and France — where Le Monde took
offense but Industry Minister Francois Loos took a dismissive tone.
THE TWISTING OF THE TAPS, however, isn’t all style and no
substance. It’s part of a long attempt by Moscow to more normalize
economic power along its European frontier. Gazprom is close to
clinching a deal with Moldova. In 2002 and 2003, Russia fought for an end to
cut-rate gas for Belarus — $28 to $50 for Ukraine and over $100
for European customers. And international economists agree that market prices should determine the
cost of Russian gas for all its buyers. British Energy Minister
Malcolm Wicks has
declared, “It’s not very helpful, I don’t think, for the UK to
take a view on the rights or wrongs of this.” The Washington
Post quotes Vadym Karasiov, director of the Institute of
Global Strategies in Kiev, as admitting that in 2005, “this was
Ukraine’s problem.” He adds that since “Russia has
internationalized the dispute” it is “hurting its own image,” and
suggests that “[t]ime is working for Ukraine now.”
But responsibility is too evenly split between Russia and
Ukraine, and the crisis too attenuated. Europe is more troubled by
the frank expression of Russian economic power than it is truly
affected. And Russia, in agreeing to turn the taps back up for
Europe’s benefit, demonstrates just how little it stands to gain
from creating market instability beyond Kiev. Since the West,
particularly in the wake of the Orange Revolution, cannot abide a
failing Ukraine, the EU will play a proactive role in working to
make up the balance in payments. Yushchenko has rejected loans before, characterizing them as
“alms” — but in that case it was Putin, not Europe, making the
offer. Now, perhaps, a Western bailout package would make up an
offer he can’t refuse.
It’s an excessively weak Ukraine, then — not an overly
assertive Russia — that motivates real concern. Judging strength
and weakness can’t be done in a vacuum, of course — there are some
instances in which Russian assertiveness makes Ukraine weak, and by
design. This is, to an extent, one of those instances — but the
appropriate reaction is to bolster Kiev, not seek out conflict with
Moscow.
RUSSIA IS ENTERING INTO a period of tremendous usefulness to the
West — particularly America. The elements of true multipolarity
are more present in the Russian case than, for example, the French:
there is nothing Paris can do or not do to affect the trajectory of
Iranian nuclear politics, for example, whereas Russia’s carrots and
sticks can have a real effect. In fact, Russia’s assertive behavior
on gas should be viewed in light of the key role Moscow is playing
in the brewing Iranian crisis. We are headed toward a final
rejection of the Russian enrichment option by Tehran, and the
collapse of Russian opposition to punishment by the Security
Council. Since China will not stand alone, among great powers, in
solidarity with Iran, Russia is the critical nation in the creation
of a united front — tremendously helpful for the legitimacy of any
successful action against Tehran, be it nonmilitary or
military.
Therefore it’s attractive for Russia to flex its muscles
independently on its European flank, helping Europe out of the same
false crisis it created, before joining in with the EU and the U.S.
on the real crisis over Iran. The old wariness over unilateral
Russian demonstrations of capricious power is difficult for some to
modulate. But the time has come to recognize that Russia and the
U.S. are natural partners — each with needs the other can fulfill.
In a world where the old realist conceptualization of politics has
sometimes seemed to lose much of its force, dealing constructively
with Russia brings those traditional forms to the fore.
Like it or not, thwarting Iran is more important than ensuring a
vibrant NGO community in Russia. Transitioning to Russian oil —
away from Middle Eastern oil — is a worthy goal that, as part of a
comprehensive policy, can help bring Russia into the Western orbit
where it belongs. Permitting the risk of a Russian freezeout of
Europe may be less than ideal, but when Russia is frozen out of
Europe it has proven itself as unmanageable politically as it is
demanding. In isolation or in antagonistic alignment, an
anti-Western Russia for the 21st century would be a geostrategic
disaster all on its own — without taking into the account the
extent to which Russia is a natural ally against every enemy we are
likely to face in the future. As an unaffected interested party,
the U.S. should work with Europe to bring Ukrainian gas payments
into accord with market rates, turning with all due speed to the
channeling of Russia’s energies into the other end of the bargain
— a decisive array of power against an Iran problem for which we
are rapidly running out of viable options.
James G. Poulos is a writer and attorney living in
Washington, D.C. His commentaries are found at Postmodern
Conservative.
