How the British won -- and lost -- Iraq's second largest city.
(Page 2 of 2)
OF COURSE, DEFENDERS OF THE British approach to the security situation in southern Iraq will deftly point out the considerable differences that exist between the American and British positions within Iraq. A primary distinction is the sympathies of the population itself, who -- while perhaps not welcoming -- were far more accommodating of a British presence than the Sunni population was towards its American occupiers, making the maintenance of their favor more important. Furthermore, British forces stationed in Iraq possessed only a fraction of the firepower and brute force made available to American forces, requiring the British army to tread lightly.
The tactical realities of Basra did indeed prescribe a different approach to peacekeeping -- but did not entail a virtual surrender of control to extremist elements. With a somewhat sympathetic population, the British could have been far more forceful in girding the regional political process from takeover by fanatic actors. Instead, they dodged the controversy that would inevitably ensue by welcoming all comers and challenging no one, a decision that was sure to facilitate the rise of those who possess and are willing to use violent means. Perhaps this ascension was inevitable, but the ease by which it was accomplished calls into question the fortitude behind the eloquent pro-democracy statements of British leaders such as Prime Minister Tony Blair.
The purpose of this article is not to celebrate the turn of events in Basra or to express even the slightest hint of schadenfreude; quite the opposite, as its sole intent is to point out the failings that have endangered and now threaten to derail the entire process of Iraqi democratization, wasting the invaluable contributions of thousands of brave and resourceful British soldiers. Any achievements that have come out of Basra -- the avoidance of full-scale civil war being one -- are primarily the result of the heroic efforts carried out by British servicemen and women. The British government, however, through its insistence on an insufferably non-interventionist policy, has risked the survival of even these limited successes. Due to their continued recalcitrance, the British military, along with the burgeoning democratic institutions of Iraq, may soon pay the price for the once celebrated "soft" approach, which has been revealed as a camouflage intended to preface the absence of any cohesive policy whatsoever.