With Friday’s release of the long-awaited Mehlis
report, the speculation concerning the future of Bashar
al-Assad and his nation has reached a fever pitch. Its publication
is only the latest in a long line of scandals that have buffeted
the regime in recent months, beginning with the murder of Rafik
Hariri, continuing with the humiliating Syrian retreat from
Lebanon, and taking a deadly turn two weeks ago with the assisted
suicide of Assad-stalwart Ghazi Kana’an. This dizzying series of
events — taking place in the usually staid dictatorship of Syria
— has elicited a stream of prognostications that envision the
Assad regime falling within months. Headlines scream of “siege,”
“panic,” and “fear,” while pundits breathlessly write Bashar’s
obituary in advance.
The reports of Bashar al-Assad’s imminent demise are,
unfortunately, far too optimistic, reflecting our hopes and desires
more than the grim reality of Bashar’s durability. The rising
degree of “pressure” oft mentioned by the press is more indicative
of the media’s and the U.N.’s overestimation of their own relevance
and ability rather than the actual burden being placed on the Assad
regime. While CNN and Detlev Mehlis flail away at the Ba’athist
edifice, Assad — who cares little about “public opinion” — need
only mollify certain minute segments of his populace to retain
control over everyday life in Syria.
Chief among any dictator’s essential support network are the
secret police and the armed forces. Bashar has worked assiduously
since assuming the throne five years ago to ensure the abject
loyalty of the Ba’athist security apparatus, placing acolytes and
family members — such as brother-in-law and Mehlis investigation
chief suspect Asef Shawkat — in positions of high authority. Such
men rely on the unifying figure of Assad to cement their own
legitimacy; why they would ever seek his ouster and threaten their
own positions within the government is inexplicable. Bashar’s
absolute control over the police agencies was all but confirmed
with the death of Ghazi Kana’an, whose influence within the
government was thought to bestow upon him the status of an
untouchable. His probable murder indicates that even powerful
veterans of the Syrian security services cannot hope to challenge
the domination of President Assad.
Bashar’s rule is further ensured by the loyalty of a small but
potent community of elites. Under his father, these figures —
mostly influential officials who control almost all national
industries — were given carte blanche to loot Syria’s treasury and
resources, an allowance that continued uninterrupted following the
death of Hafiz. Although they may shake their heads ruefully at the
blunders of Bashar, they are certainly aware of the absence of any
leadership alternative that would both ensure national stability
while also enabling them to continue bleeding the populace dry.
The diviners of Assad’s fall have pointed to the disastrous
state of the Syrian economy as an indication of his tenuous grip on
power. While Syria’s economy continues to lurch between decrepit
and moribund, there is little evidence to suggest that a
system-wide crash is in the offing. The Syrian economy has been a
veritable basket case for decades, reliably posting anemic growth
rates below the requisite levels needed to maintain an economically
viable existence for Syria’s rapidly growing population. This
uninterrupted streak of disappointment has seemingly inured the
population to its own poverty, at least in the short term. While
popular dissatisfaction certainly runs rampant, it has yet to
manifest itself in organized opposition, as Syria’s various
dissident groups remain fractured and inconsequential.
Syria’s increasing diplomatic isolation is also used to cast
doubt on Assad’s permanence. Due to one of the most inept foreign
policies ever enacted by any government, Bashar Assad has
single-handedly managed to reinvigorate the Franco-American
alliance, shatter Syria’s long-standing occupation of Lebanon, and
turn former allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt into irritated
bystanders. In a democracy, such failure would virtually ensure a
change in leadership; in Syria, it simply means quiet grumbling
among the national elite. The idea of external Arab pressure
serving as a credible catalyst for change inside Damascus is almost
laughable, considering the fact that the Mubarak government in
Cairo is attempting a leadership transition virtually identical to
that carried out by the Assad dynasty five years ago. To ensure the
support of a sizable portion of the Arab world, the Syrian spin
machine is attempting to label the Mehlis report an invention of
Israel and America, a line of reasoning that should appeal to large
numbers of Arabs who have proven maddeningly susceptible to
conspiracy theories in the past.
As previously noted, the public release of the Mehlis report has
fueled new speculation concerning the future of the Assad
dictatorship. Mehlis’ account has been described by some optimists
as a veritable bombshell that could shake the very foundations of
the Syrian state. The report, while not referring to Bashar
al-Assad by name, does effectively catalogue the relationships and
machinations that culminated in the vicious murder of Hariri and
the subsequent cover-up. What exactly the U.N. will do with the
findings, however, is another matter entirely, given the world
body’s long record of idling in the face of tyranny and terrorism.
No U.N. constabulary will descend on the Presidential Palace in
Damascus with arrest warrants in hand, nor will Syria’s enablers
such as Iran, Russia, and China allow the passage of effective
sanctions. The Mehlis report may simply become additional fodder
for U.N. critics who decry Turtle Bay’s role as an international
debating society, where much is discussed but little of substance
is accomplished.
The desirability of Bashar al-Assad’s downfall is
unquestionable; Bashar continues to fund Hezbollah and Hamas, aid
the murderous insurgency in Iraq, and brutalize his own people.
Regrettably for those who would like nothing better than to witness
his overthrow, Bashar still has support in the quarters that are
critical to the survival of any dictatorship — the security
services, the army, and the moneyed class. Until cracks appear in
this bulwark — hopefully incurred by strenuous and consistent
American pressure of the hard-edged variety — there is little
reason to wish of regime change in Damascus anytime soon.
