According to the Washington Post, the newest edition of
the classified National Intelligence Estimate includes a revision of the prevailing view in
the intelligence community on the Iranian nuclear program. Whereas
the consensus had been that Iran was five years or fewer from
building nuclear weapons, the new thinking suggests that, while the
mullahs are certainly wedded to the pursuit of such weapons, they
may actually be closer to ten years away.
Set aside, for a moment, the point that the American
intelligence community’s record on predicting such things is, to
put it nicely, less than perfect. Let’s take it at face value that
Iran is ten years from going nuclear. What does that mean for U.S.
strategy toward the Islamic Republic?
In short, it means the case for pursuing regime change in Tehran
is as strong, and perhaps stronger, than ever.
To review: the Iranian government is America’s enemy, and the
ally and sponsor of terrorists. Hezbollah has long enjoyed Iranian
sponsorship as they killed Americans in Beirut in the '80s and at
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. Tehran almost certainly
provides some direct support for elements of the insurgency in
Iraq, including the Shiite radicals who probably murdered
journalist Steven
Vincent earlier this week. There is evidence of al Qaeda taking
refuge in Iran, as some in the Bush administration warned
immediately after the end of major combat in Afghanistan, and even
reports of more intimate connections between Tehran and al Qaeda.
(Kenneth R. Timmerman has collected the most frightening such
reports, including claims by defectors that the Iranian government
was aware of 9/11 beforehand and that Osama bin Laden himself is
now in Iran, in his book Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown
with Iran.)
It is important that such a regime not acquire nuclear weapons.
It would be even better for it to fall. The problem, though, is
that if we believe Iran is right around the corner from going
nuclear, and that ongoing diplomatic efforts to convince it to halt
production are doomed to fail (and they are), then those two goals
may conflict. The mullahs are hated by the people of Iran,
particularly the youth (and Iran has an especially young
population). America, as the sworn enemy of their oppressive
leaders, is admired among the discontented population. But if the
U.S. takes aggressive action to stop Tehran’s nuclear weapon
development, that could change. A full-scale invasion and
occupation of Iran, with all that the American military has to
contend with at the moment, is impractical, so military action
would mean bombing Iranian nuclear facilities to delay their
progress. Such an operation would not be “clean”; the regime has
been careful to place many of its nuclear facilities so as to
maximize civilian casualties. An attack would stoke nationalist
anger at America and cost the goodwill of the Iranian people, which
is the best thing we have going in the country.
As long as we maintain that goodwill, there is the chance of
pushing the regime over by fomenting revolution, both with frequent
rhetorical support for Iranian democrats and with material support
for anti-regime elements analogous to the support provided for
anti-Communist militants under the Reagan Doctrine. Those who favor
bombing strikes argue, though, that we don’t have time to follow
that route. Reuel Marc Gerecht put it this way in his June 9, 2003
Weekly Standard cover story:
Until young men feel differently, it is difficult to
see how a new revolutionary movement can develop. It is conceivable
that an effective covert action against the mullahs could be
devised, but it’s just not likely within the time frame allowed by
Iran’s nuclear program, which may well produce nuclear weapons
within two years.
Two years since Gerecht wrote that, Iran is thankfully still
nuke-free. If the NIE is correct, we have do indeed have time to
directly help build and support an armed resistance.
We should do so immediately. Ten years can go by fast, after
all.
