In early May, two overseas flights to Boston were diverted to
Bangor, Maine, within days of each other. The first was Air France
flight 322 from Paris. The second was Alitalia flight 618 from
Milan. In both cases, a passenger’s name on the flight manifest
matched a name on the U.S. government’s no-fly list. This is not
the first time flights have been diverted to Bangor. Last
September, a United Airlines London-to-New York flight carrying the
singer formerly known as Cat Stevens was forced to land there
because the name Stevens took after converting to Islam — Yusaf
Islam — is on the no-fly list (Islam denies any terrorist
connections). The question is: If it’s supposed to be a no-fly
list, how is it that people on the list are able to board the
airplanes?
Airlines are supposed to check passengers against a no-fly list
before they are allowed to board, but the airlines don’t always
have the most current no-fly list. Current U.S. law requires
airlines to transmit the passenger lists of flights bound for the
United States to the Department of Homeland Security within 15
minutes of takeoff. DHS officials then check the names against the
no-fly list. The problem is that the names aren’t transmitted until
after takeoff, which means people are actually flying. So it’s
really a misnomer to call it a no-fly list, and the whole notion of
having such a list to prevent would-be terrorists from boarding
airplanes falls into the category of “what’s wrong with this
picture?”
The U.S. government is currently negotiating with airlines to
get the passenger lists 60 minutes before departure, but most
airlines are resisting, saying flights would be delayed. But in a
world where keywords can be Googled with a nearly instantaneous
response, transmitting and checking passenger names in a timely
fashion should not be an insurmountable problem. In fact, since
passengers cannot go through security to get to their departure
gate without first having a boarding pass, wouldn’t it make sense
for those names to be transmitted to DHS on a rolling, real-time
basis? Such a procedure is certainly not beyond the capabilities of
modern technology. More important, it would be a way to prevent
people whose names are on the no-fly list from flying — sparing
all the other passengers the major inconvenience of a detour to
Bangor and the airlines the not trivial cost of an unscheduled
landing and departure.
But the no-fly list problem goes beyond the basic issue of this
list not being checked until after an aircraft has already taken
off. The larger problem is knowing whether the person in question
is the same person on the no-fly list. In both the Air France and
Alitalia cases, the problem was mistaken identity.
Mistaken identity should not be a problem since the US-VISIT
(Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) program
requires practically all visitors to apply for a visa (in their
country of origin) to enter the United States. That application
process includes providing biographical and biometric information
— two index finger scans and a digital photograph. Common sense
says that people who apply for visas should be cross-checked
against the no-fly list and any other terrorist watch lists to
determine if they are a potential threat.
In the case of the Air France flight, although the passenger in
question had the same name and birth date as someone on the no-fly
list, he had been issued a visa and he did not match the physical
description of the person on the no-fly list. In other words, there
was no real reason to divert the 169 passengers aboard Air France
flight 332 and delay their arrival in Boston. And there was no real
need to embarrass and humiliate the man, his wife, and two children
by escorting them off the plane, detaining them, and subjecting
them to questioning.
Homeland security is serious business. Preventing would-be
terrorists from entering the country is one of the most important
things that DHS must do. Yet managing a no-fly list should be a
relatively simple and straightforward affair. For example, even if
the no-fly list is sent to DHS within 15 minutes after takeoff, why
is it not apparently checked until the aircraft is almost ready to
land in the United States — several hours into its flight?
Yet the evidence suggests that we can’t do something this simple
right. And if we can’t do the simple things right, what are the
prospects that we will be able to do the more difficult tasks of
homeland security — like screening for weapons of mass
destruction?
