Three anniversaries this year remind us how unique the American
response has been to danger to us and to our allies during the past
60 years and what a dangerous world it still is. They underscore
how our enemies became our allies, how our close friends are not so
close anymore, and how new enemies took the place of previous
enemies. The anniversaries also signal where nuclear power has been
and where it’s going.
Recently we witnessed the 60th commemoration of D-Day, the
Battle of the Bulge and the liberation of survivors of Auschwitz.
We were reminded again of the sacrifice of the Greatest Generation
in rescuing the globe from Axis tyranny.
Sixty years ago, the war came to a sudden halt with the
explosion of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August
1945. An estimated 103,000 Japanese perished immediately or soon
after as the result of acute radiation poisoning.
Had we not dropped the Big One to persuade the Empire of the
futility of further resistance, U.S. military planners estimated an
American invasion of the Japanese home islands — and Japanese
kamikaze human suicide bomb resistance — might result in
500,000 American casualties. It is reasonable to believe Japanese
casualties would be similar. That level of casualties would have
made the battle for Iwo Jima look like a round of miniature golf.
Nevertheless, we can expect the 60th anniversary of our use of the
atomic bomb to be as politically polarizing as the Air and Space
Museum’s Enola Gay exhibit.
When we became the only nation to use nuclear weapons against an
enemy, we also ignited a firestorm of debate over nuclear weapons
that continued throughout the Cold War. It now seems almost quaint
how American organizations such as Physicians for Social
Responsibility and mainstream Protestant denominations urged world
nuclear disarmament. If the Soviets would not disarm, then we
should do it unilaterally. Never mind that not renouncing American
first use of nuclear weapons theoretically kept Soviet armor from
racing across Europe. As nuclear weapons kept an uneasy peace in
Europe, the U.S., and USSR battled through surrogates in
Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua.
If the United States and Russia are no longer pointing
sufficiently large levels of nuclear weapons at each other to cause
Mutually Assured Destruction, the threat has shifted in other
directions. It has now been 35 years since the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into force. This
anniversary was chiefly missed by the media in March.
The club of five nations with nuclear weapons — U.S., Russia,
United Kingdom, France and China — kept their weapons. Forty-three
other nations signed the 1970 treaty, renouncing their intent to
get weapons to gain assistance with developing a civilian nuclear
power industry. Signatory nations have increased to 190 today.
India, Pakistan and Israel were not bound by the treaty and all
have nuclear weapons today. North Korea signed NPT in 1986, but
announced its intent to withdraw in 2003, causing anxiety to its
neighbors and Washington.
Enter Iran. The Shah sought nuclear weapons and this search was
abandoned by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran now claims to only be
pursuing a peaceful nuclear power industry but may be enriching
plutonium for other then peaceful purposes. New Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko has discovered at least six nuclear-capable
missiles to be exported to Russia were actually diverted to Iran.
Iran, of course, has been a state sponsor of regional terrorism so
a capacity to strike targets several hundred miles away, which
includes Israel and American bases in the region, is scary.
However, NPT has worked well in general. It is ironic that
Japan, the target of the first use of nuclear weapons, has 54
nuclear reactors fueling its insatiable demand for electricity.
These have often been discussed as a tempting target for
terrorists. Operation of the Japanese reactors is also held up to
American nuclear power students as how not to run
reactors; last August, four Japanese reactor workers were scalded
to death by escaping steam. Our more than 100 civilian reactors are
operated safely and heavily guarded.
The third anniversary is chiefly unlike the first two dates. In
August 2000, the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk was lost
with all hands at the bottom of the cold Barents Sea.
Russia has never had the level of safety in its civilian and
military nuclear industry we often take for granted. Compare, for
example, Chernobyl with Three Mile Island, which still operates
today. Nevertheless, losing the Kursk was a huge blow to
Russian military prestige. Russia also has 30 civilian nuclear
reactors. Chechen separatists have demonstrated an ability to
strike deep within Russian on suicide missions. Striking any of
these reactors would make an unprecedented statement on a public
still mourning the loss of Kursk sailors.
When media elites focus on these three anniversaries, will they
report on the nuances of the calculation of risks and rewards? How
many Japanese and Americans would have died if the atomic bomb had
not convinced the Japanese Empire to surrender? How many nations
are living up to NPT? How successful is the civilian nuclear power
industry in freeing nations from importing oil or natural gas to
fuel turbines? How safe American civilian and military reactors
are?
No, probably not. Instead, we can expect quotes from
anti-nuclear power advocates, stories about victims of the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs and threats of accidents and
terrorism.
