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"The world has changed," Russia's Defense Minister S.B. Ivanov told a NATO conference this July. "Yet, the new age must not necessarily be accompanied by dismantlement of the military and the political legacy of the past. I have already said this and I want to say it again: Russia regards nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as the basis for global stability."

Ivanov is proclaiming Russia's indifference to a disarmament regime. We are now faced with a Russia blatantly uncooperative with regard to CTR as well as other American foreign policy objectives. But in the eyes of CTR cheerleaders, the program overrides U.S. national security interests. Last year a U.S. CTR official went to Moscow during the week of March 25 to cajole the Russians into accepting an additional $150 million at the very moment the Russians were thumbing their noses at U.S. overtures for cooperation regarding Iraq. As the U.S. continued to dole out hundreds of millions of dollars to help Russia clean up a weapons crisis of its own making, Russians were scheming in back rooms at the U.N. to thwart a war with Iraq deemed necessary for American security. As the U.S. writes checks, Russia refuses to stop selling nuclear secrets and materials to the mullahs in Iran, official sponsors of Hezbollah, the organization many blame for the Khobar Towers attack in 1996.

ACCORDING TO BILL McCOY, WHO formerly dealt with the mechanics of CTR policy, the U.S. is paying to dismantle Russian SS-19 missiles. But Russia has now purchased some 30 new SS-19 missiles from Ukraine to take their place in the same silos. The question is: Are we more secure with 30 rusting SS-19s taking up 30 missile silos, or with 30 unused SS-19s with warheads aimed at the United States? As Justin Bernier points out in Parameters, "Russia's conscious decision to vigorously invest in new ballistic missile submarines and new long range bombers and new ICBMs and gigantic bomb shelters, but not in ongoing disarmament projects, raises serious questions about its willingness to properly prioritize its growing economic resources."

The CTR program inexplicably paid nearly $400,000 for repairs and operation of an active, commissioned Russian nuclear fuel ship, the PM-74, after the request had been disapproved twice, once by acting principal director Susan Koch and again by deputy assistant secretary of defense Marshall Billingslea. Who approved this payment after disapproval by two senior policy managers? Additionally, at the same time it paid for improvements to the de-fueling ship, CTR was funding on-shore nuclear de-fueling facilities to accomplish the same task. More worrisome still is that only concern for "Russian integrity" prevents the on-shore de-fueling facilities from being used to refuel Russian nuclear submarines.

Destroying Russia's WMD stockpiles is a noble goal. But the mischief rampant in the CTR program isn't advancing it.

topics:
Foreign Policy, Vladimir Putin, Environment, Law, Military, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Energy