The Fed has now moved to its most inflationary policy stance
since the late 1970s. China, which pegs its currency to the dollar,
and therefore accepts Chairman Greenspan as its central banker, has
seen a complete reversal of fortunes. It experienced painful
deflation between 1999 and 2002, and is now experiencing enough
inflation to compel dramatic credit tightening by the central
government.
THIS VOLATILITY IN MONETARY policy is damaging to any economy. More
to the point, it is unnecessary. The main reason for these sharp
swings in interest rates is that the Fed seems to follow what the
Wall Street Journal dubs “The Greenspan Standard.” This
standard seems to flow from the forecasts of the chairman
himself.
Looking back at the arguments used by the Fed to justify its
policy shifts, there is no consistent framework. In the late 1990s,
the Fed argued that “insecure workers” were holding back wage
growth and therefore the true inflationary impulse of the economy
was hidden. During that same period of time, Greenspan was
supposedly an early convert to the idea that productivity growth
had accelerated, and inflation would remain subdued. These
arguments, however, were contradictory.
But then in February 2000 Greenspan took an unexpected turn. He
argued that strong productivity growth actually caused higher
inflation. His theory went like this: Strong productivity growth
boosted estimates of corporate profits and pushed up the stock
market. A rising stock market caused a wealth-induced boom in
consumer spending that exceeded supply. With aggregate demand
growing faster than aggregate supply, inflationary pressures would
increase.
The only problem with this “productivity causes inflation”
argument is that there is absolutely no economic theory to back it
up. In fact, the Fed found no support whatsoever for this argument
from the economic community at large and never repeated the
argument again. However, this did not stop the Fed from increasing
interest rates anyway.
IN RETROSPECT, IT APPEARS THAT Chairman Greenspan was making up new
economic arguments to justify the actions that he had already
decided were appropriate. This is why it is easy to call it “The
Greenspan Standard.”
There are at least two problems with this state of affairs.
First, because Greenspan alone understands this standard, whoever
replaces him will by definition have a different standard. Second,
there is no legacy for managing Fed policy. These are both
destabilizing issues. If, when a new chairman is appointed, the Fed
changes along with that appointment, there is no guarantee that
policy will remain consistent.
To avoid volatility in monetary policy, the Fed should institute
a price rule for monetary policy and target inflation rather than
unemployment, GDP growth, or stock prices. The best way to do this
is to follow sensitive market prices such as the dollar, commodity
prices, and gold. These markets react to monetary policy well
before consumer price inflation and do not suffer the same
measurement problems as lagging economic indicators, such as the
labor market or capacity utilization.
As the president begins to think about who might replace
Greenspan in 2006, continuity and stability in policy should be the
number one issue. And the only way to guarantee this stability over
time is for the president to appoint someone who believes in a
price rule for money and does not count on a cult of personality to
defend the institution. Steve Forbes, Larry Kudlow, and David
Malpass would all fit the bill. There are less than two years to
lay the groundwork. It is time to start now.