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Special Report

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Newsweek reported that some U.S. officials believe that Chalabi has turned sensitive information over to Tehran, material that could "get people killed," according to one source. David Frum, among others, has defended Chalabi from this admittedly amorphous charge. But Newsday cites American officials who believe the INC Information Collection Program, paid for by America, passed along classified U.S. documents, which "kept the Iranians informed about what we were doing." Another claim reported by Newsday is that the INC reflected Iranian disinformation back at Washington, providing "information to provoke the United States into getting rid of Saddam Hussein." Some sources suggest that last week's startling raid was animated by these claims.

Even if Chalabi did not stretch cooperation to include espionage, his Iranian connection bolsters the perception that Chalabi always has put his interest before that of the U.S. "He was willing to ally with anyone to get where he is now, whether it was the neocons, the Israelis or the Iranians," said Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer.

DURING THE DISASTROUS EXPLOSION of violence in Iraq in early April when the Marines moved on the city of Fallujah and al-Sadr's militia seized control of several cities, Chalabi said nothing, failing to back U.S. military action. He finally opined that "Najaf must not be touched," which would in effect turn the city into a sanctuary for al-Sadr. Chalabi renewed his criticism of U.S. military operations in Najaf and Karbala in mid-May. When Paul Bremer decided to reverse de-Baathification, and rely on generals from the defeated regime to help maintain order in Fallujah, Chalabi denounced the move as akin to "allowing Nazis" into the post-World War II German government.

Control of Saddam Hussein's files gave Chalabi another advantage. The U.S. may have conquered Baghdad, but the INC ended up in charge of 60 tons of Baath party materials. The value of those documents, especially for blackmail purposes, is inestimable. Indeed, a Pentagon official told the Washington Times that allegations that Chalabi was using this information to blackmail people involved in the corrupt Iraqi oil-for-food program led to the raid. And Newsweek reports that the INC exposed the Baath Party connection of a Ministry of Science and Technology official who refused to approve an over-priced contract advanced by the INC.

Money also has helped fuel Chalabi's ambitions. Whitley Bruner, a CIA agent who worked with Chalabi in the early 1990s, notes that Chalabi has always had "to spend money to gain loyalty -- to rent loyalty."

Only last week did Washington cut off its generous contributions, an estimated $4 million annually (which Chalabi defended as "a very small program in terms of cost"). More important, Iraq has become his bank. Chalabi dispenses significant patronage.

Columnist Arnaud de Borchgrave writes that Chalabi has "a say in which companies get the nod for some of the $18.4 billion earmarked for reconstruction." And, claims de Borchgrave, a generous commission is reportedly required. One unnamed U.S. business executive said: "The commission was high, even by Middle East standards." No wonder that Chas Freeman has characterized the Iraqi view of the Iraqi Governing Council as "Ahmed Chalabi and the Twenty Thieves." Indeed, allegations of financial impropriety also may have contributed to the search of Chalabi's home and offices. Sabah Nouri, chosen by Chalabi to be the Finance Ministry's top anti-corruption official, was recently arrested for embezzlement and other financial improprieties.

So far, despite the large cloud of smoke surrounding Chalabi -- the Iraqi police sought to arrest 15 aides and other INC members -- the size of the fires of corruption and espionage and his role in setting them remain unclear. Incontrovertible, however, is the fact that Chalabi always has been his, not America's, agent, irrespective of truth and consequences. For instance, the INC funneled information, which turned out to be incorrect, to U.N. weapons inspectors in the 1990s. At least they sought confirmation.

American officials were much more credulous. Although the CIA severed ties with the INC in 1995 (the INC has complained of an agency "smear campaign" against it), the allegedly hard-headed neoconservatives were far more gullible. Much of the alleged intelligence backing claims that Iraq possessed significant WMD came from INC informants. For example, charges involving "mobile bio-weapons labs" were offered to an alleged defector, a brother of a top INC official, who spoke with the INC, not the U.S. government. These charges were false. Indeed, while running the administration's post-war WMD inspection program, David Kay reviewed the defector's claims and concluded: "He was wrong about so much. Physical descriptions he gave for buildings and sites simply didn't match reality. Things started to fall apart."

Another INC-provided defector did speak with American officials. Coached by the INC, he apparently convinced political appointees in the Bush administration, even though the Defense Intelligence Agency pegged him as a likely liar.

The INC also helpfully disseminated its erroneous claims to the international media, with predictably ill effect. Report Jonathan Landay and Tish Wells of Knight Ridder Newspapers, "The assertions in the articles reinforced President Bush's claims that Saddam Hussein should be ousted because he was in league with Osama bin Laden, was developing nuclear weapons and was hiding biological and chemical weapons."

Chalabi and company also assured Washington that the occupation as well as the war would be a cakewalk. The U.S. would be welcomed as liberators. Chalabi's soldiers would keep the peace. American forces could quickly go home.

PERHAPS CHALABI ACTUALLY knew little about the country which he hoped to liberate. After all, he'd been gone for nearly 50 years.

Or Chalabi said whatever he thought was necessary to win America's involvement. Alas, whether, like the Bush administration on WMD, the INC was simply careless and prone to say what it wanted to believe, or was engaged in intentional misrepresentation, doesn't matter much now.

Entifadh Qanbar, the INC's Director of Communications, denounces the charges against his organization as "a sustained smear campaign." After the police raid, Chalabi blamed the CIA for targeting his security chief for arrest: "The CIA has a very big grudge against him." Another INC official, Haider Musawi, said the raid was "a political game," and contended that unnamed critics "have been waging a smear campaign against Chalabi and the INC for some time."

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