By Paul Beston on 6.19.03 @ 12:06AM
The controversy over the missing WMD is a direct result of Bush's failure to explain the war.
As American military inspection teams run out of sites to check
in Iraq for WMD, Democrats are using Watergate language to ask
whether George Bush deceived the country about the Saddam threat.
Bush might have been able to avoid this trouble if he had been
willing, or able, to communicate the true rationale for the war,
which was not WMD. But since the war was sold that way, the Bush
Administration is stuck with trying to find weapons that may no
longer be there.
There are of course many possible explanations for what happened
to Saddam's stock of weapons. Jim Lacey outlines several in the
current issue of National Review. But whatever Saddam did
with the WMD that most of the world -- including the Democratic
Party -- acknowledges he had, the problem for Bush is about more
than the failure to find weapons, or defending what may have been
shoddy intelligence. The real challenge remains the same as it was
after September 11th: explaining why we are fighting in the first
place.
Saying the war in Iraq was about WMD is like saying that World
War II was about death camps. WMD is a symptom of a problem, not
the problem itself. Likewise, the misnomer "War on Terror" also
describes a symptom, a tactic, like land mines or death squads.
Bush's failure to communicate clearly is more than a semantic
issue; it has real ramifications, as the brewing scandal over the
missing WMD makes clear. Until he articulates war objectives more
consistently, future military campaigns are bound to run into
similar problems.
Bush's War on Terror is largely a war of self-defense. But most
people understand self-defense in the context of that phrase that
became so familiar during the long run-up to the Iraq conflict:
"imminent threat." How imminent Saddam's threat was to the U.S. in
2003 is difficult to say. But it is clear that, for critics of the
war, the threat would have had to be very imminent indeed to
justify taking action.
So Bush attempted to argue for imminence by making the war about
Saddam's WMD. Then he argued that Saddam was working with al Qaeda.
When these criteria ran into resistance, Bush began talking about
liberation of Iraq as the objective of the war. This was by far the
most troublesome case he made, with its Wilsonian implications of a
crusading superpower. If conservatives were initially uneasy about
liberation as a justification in itself, they seem to have gotten
over their squeamishness now that Saddam has been toppled. Even
now, in the fever swamps of Fox News, Sean Hannity can be heard
celebrating Bush as the liberator of Iraq, as if liberation alone
justified sending American servicemen to die. Wasn't there some
larger reason they were fighting?
Of course there was. We are in a war in which our adversaries
come from a region of the world that is overrun with fanaticism and
cruelty. They have no single national identifier, only a perverted
and deadly religious passion aimed at destroying the West. In the
days after September 11th, the Bush Administration correctly
determined that victory in the war would require confrontations
with both stateless terror organizations and sovereign states that
support or breed terror, and that ultimately the problem of Islamic
terrorism could not be addressed without transformative changes in
the structures of Islamic societies. Only then could we be
confident that the atrocities of September 11th would not revisit
us. The larger war -- of which Iraq was merely a battle -- was not
about WMD or links to this or that terrorist group. The United
States was in conflict with a number of different groups and states
that, taken as a whole, presented a grave threat to national
security.
The logic of this analysis has implications that the
Administration has been reluctant to fully articulate publicly. If
we are in a war that has already begun, then we can, just as in a
conventional war, take action against our adversaries at whatever
time is auspicious for us to do so. In our own self-defense, we can
become aggressors. The closest Bush came to expressing this idea
was his declaration of the new doctrine of pre-emption, which was
fine as far as it went.
But Bush sold pre-emption only on the basis of imminence, of
clear and present danger. He did not extend the mandate for
pre-emption to include environments that were breeding grounds for
eventual hostility, even if their dangers were not immediately
operational. From time to time during the long pre-war period,
Donald Rumsfeld or Paul Wolfowitz made statements alluding to this
larger vision, but Bush focused more on the narrow case of WMD. The
public remembers a president's arguments for a war, not those of
his aides.
As a result, pre-emption quickly became bogged down in the WMD
debate. The public heard an evidentiary justification for war not
unlike that of a prosecutor seeking a conviction. Instead of being
anchored by a stable truth, the war was dependent on a set of mere
facts. If those facts collapsed, so would the case for the war. And
that takes us up to the present.
If Bush had sold this war as part of the larger goal of
transformation -- Iraq as the next theater in an ongoing war that
had already been declared -- then an unambiguous case would exist
for the campaign, no matter what Saddam did with his chemicals and
toxins. Where there could have been a coherent vision for Americans
to accept or reject, there is instead a deepening swirl of
contention and suspicion. With each passing day, it is more
unlikely that a massive discovery of WMD will be made to prove the
president's limited case. But far more frustrating than that is the
knowledge that all of this could have been avoided if the president
had explained what the Battle of Iraq was really about.
topics:
Islam, Environment, Military, Iraq