Leaks are a currency of politics. To leak is to boost one policy
or bash another, to promote a pal or punish a political foe. It is
the common practice of too many in Congress and the Executive
Branch. A leak of a photo taken by a spy satellite may have less
value than one about who is sleeping with whom. But both are
potentially good stories, and the fact that publishing one may
release classified information to the bad guys isn’t considered
nearly enough.
We are in a war, and leaks are a constant problem for the CIA,
NSA, and everyone else in the intelligence business. The problem
has become so acute that the CIA has floated what should be an
astounding trial balloon.
James Bruce of the CIA’s Foreign Denial and Deception Committee
argues for new laws to prevent future damaging leaks. In a policy
memo entitled, “The
Consequences of Permissive Neglect,” Bruce says new laws should
“[h]old government leakers accountable for providing classified
intelligence to persons who do not have authorized access to that
information, irrespective of intent; and hold unauthorized
recipients accountable for publishing information that they know to
be classified.” From Congress and the press there is silence, the
worst possible reaction.
In these days of 24/7 news, there’s little discretion exercised,
and there is little incentive for reporters to assess what harm can
come from publishing a leak. People in the media believe that leaks
are both good for democracy and not very damaging. Bruce says this,
too, is wrong: “The view that leaks are harmless is further
nourished by other popular myths that the government
over-classifies everything — including intelligence — and
classifies way too much. This seduction has become a creed among
uncleared, anti-secrecy proponents.” In my long career in and out
of government, I have held some of the highest security clearances
there are. I can’t speak as an intelligence professional, but the
press is right in saying that too much gets classified. But Bruce
is also right — terribly so — in saying that leaks are damaging
national security severely.
Bruce gives a list of damaging leaks, some chilling examples. On
20 June 2002, Ari Fleischer said at a White House briefing:
“In 1998… as a result of an inappropriate leak of NSA
information, it was revealed about NSA being able to listen to
Osama bin Laden on his satellite phone. As a result of the
disclosure, he stopped using it. As a result of the public
disclosure, the United States was denied the opportunity to monitor
and gain information that could have been very valuable for
protecting our country.”
That example hits hard, because the story Fleischer referred to
was in the conservative Washington Times, by reporter Bill
Gertz. If something this important is leaked to a conservative
paper, and it chooses to publish it regardless of the likely
effect, what can you expect from the rest?
As Bruce says, the problem is much bigger: “What the public
cannot easily know…is that the bin Laden example cited here
is just the tip of the iceberg. In recent years, all
intelligence agencies — CIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency, to cite just the larger ones — have lost
important collection capabilities, including against high-value
terrorist targets.”
There are two parts of this problem: the leakers and the media.
With regard to the leakers, I side with Bruce. The laws against
leaking classified information are convoluted and unenforceable.
Let’s rewrite these laws to make them clear, and to ensure harsh
punishment of those in the government — Congress included — who
leak classified information. Bruce is wrong, though, about jailing
reporters and editors, and fining companies so hugely that they
will stop their presses.
There are four freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment:
freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and
freedom to petition the government for redress. It’s no accident
that these four are in the First Amendment. The Founding Fathers
understood that they are the foundation on which all the others
stand. Like a nuclear weapon, a First Amendment change is the last
resort. We may someday have to face it, but I believe there is
another answer to Bruce’s concerns that has not been tried: strict
self-censorship by the press. Quit laughing, dammit.
Teaching the press to police itself will probably be as
productive as teaching a pig to sing. But we have to try. The
press’ problems these days only begin with credibility. Journalists
are beset by bias, diversity, and every crank political idea that
has come up in the past thirty years. What the press has to learn
is responsibility.
Many journalists learned about operational security while
embedded with our troops in Iraq. They were allowed to report
things that happened, but were forbidden to talk about locations,
planned operations, and in some cases even the identities of the
units they were with. All of them — with the horrific exception of
Jerry Rivers (aka Geraldo Rivera) — accepted the responsibility
that came with the privilege of battlefield reporting. This lesson
needs to be translated and implemented for all who scribble
here.
There is a responsibility that comes with each freedom, and
freedom of the press is no exception. Every journalist has the duty
to determine if the story he is about to publish will give away
national security information that could benefit our enemies.
The problem with self-policing is that almost none of the people
in the press have any way to gauge the criticality of the
classified information they are given. To meet the pressures of
deadlines and competition, this self-policing mechanism would have
to include people who were involved in classified matters. Here’s
one way to do it.
First, all of the television and radio networks, newspapers and
magazines would enter into a written contract with each other. That
contract would provide that they would train their editors and
reporters to treat classified information differently from other
facts that come into their possession. Every news reporter,
columnist, and broadcaster would be required to agree to submit the
question of publishing any information known or suspected to be
classified to a committee established by the industry. Any failure
to do so resulting in publication of classified information would
result in instant dismissal and blackballing from journalism.
Next, DoD could grant security clearances to a committee of say,
a dozen retired editors, broadcasters and consultants. These
consultants — who would be on the committee in equal number to the
journalists — would be hired from among the retired intelligence
and defense communities. They would be sworn to not leak anything
to any news media, at any time, and their duty would be as a
fiduciary. Any breach of it would be sanctionable in court, and
with permanent loss of their security clearance. To operate, the
committee would be given a SCIF - a sensitive compartmented
information facility — secure phones and agree to be on call
24/7.
Anytime a reporter, an editor or a broadcaster was leaked
classified information — or information, such as what Bill Gertz
reported that should be recognizable as classified even if not so
labeled by the source — the leak would be tossed to the Classified
Reporting Committee. They would read it, confer on it, and vote —
all within two hours — on whether it should be published. Any
report not having a two-thirds vote in favor of publication would
be spiked.
The Committee’s members will have vastly different views on many
leaks. But their decision would be final, and all the media would
agree to abide by it. No appeals, no second chances, and no
quibbling.
This system won’t be perfect, and not many in the press will
want to abide by any system that gives editorial control to anyone
outside their publication. But with freedom comes responsibility.
I’d rather accept the responsibility than risk losing the
freedom.
