In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein was faced with
United Nations mandates for disarmament, weapons inspections and
economic sanctions. His strategy from then on was to buy time.
During the years of the initial inspections he used endless
quibbles to slow and frustrate the process, ultimately ejecting the
inspectors for good in 1998. The feckless U.N. Security Council
passed resolution after resolution. While Iraq was limited to
pumping enough oil to meet humanitarian needs of its people, Saddam
soon controlled a thriving black market in oil, sending a stream of
trucks out to Syria. Meanwhile, his scientists and technicians were
at work on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons plans and
development.
Once U.N. Resolution 1441 passed last September, Saddam opened a
new chapter in his buy-time strategy. This involved the appearance
of cooperation, mixed with delaying tactics. The weapons inventory
required under 1441 produced a voluminous, but incomplete,
document. Among other shortcomings, Iraq failed to account for
biological and chemical weapons the original inspectors had
found.
By appearing to cooperate with the inspectors at various times,
Saddam encouraged those on the Security Council with ulterior
motives to call for an extended inspection period.
During the ensuing months, every time an American or British
fighter plane bombed an Iraqi radar site in one of the “no-fly”
zones, Saddam’s propaganda machine immediately claimed several
civilians had been killed. Furthermore, he said an all-out attack
on Iraq would be met fiercely, hoping to conjure images of large
numbers of American and allied troops being killed. This, he
reasoned, would feed an anti-war movement in the U.S. and
Europe.
If he could string out till summer a concoction of equal parts
cooperation, denial that he had weapons of mass destruction,
frightening propaganda and characterizing Iraq as a victim of
imperialism, he might avoid any military action for the balance of
the year. If he could do that, those 200,000 allied troops
gathering in the region could not be kept in a state of high
readiness for months on end. The cost would be stupendous and
political opposition to their deployment would build until George
Bush would be forced to bring them home . That, coupled with
anti-war sentiment and an election in 2004, would make it
impossible for Bush to mount another buildup next year. That has
been Saddam’s game. In it, he enlisted, wittingly or unwittingly, a
number of players to help his cause:
Blix and Baradei. They are beginning to look
like See-no-Evil and Hear-no-Evil. Their reports to the Security
Council are always of the
on-the-one-hand-this-on-the-other-hand-that sort, but with enough
hints at Iraqi cooperation to fuel the arguments of the French and
others that the inspections must go on and on and there must be no
military action. This reporting pattern thus encourages Saddam to
continue his deceive-then-cooperate-then deceive again tactics.
Anti-war Demonstrators. Typically,
demonstrations bring out a mixture of youths looking for a good
time, middle-aged hippies dreaming of the Summer of Love, earnest
peace-seekers and a hard core of anarchists and far-leftists who do
the organizing. All carry signs and shout slogans to convey
bumper-stick philosophy (“Win Without War”). They have no
alternative to forced disarmament of Saddam’s Iraq, save the hope
that, somehow, the problem will just go way.
France. The French have several reasons to act
as they are in this matter. They are Iraq’s largest trading partner
in Western Europe; they have major oil field contracts; they are
owed approximately $7 billion by Iraq; French companies, through
intermediaries, have recently sold spare parts to the Iraq Air
Force for its Mirage jets and French military helicopters; there
are some seven million Muslims in France (most from former North
African colonies) and the French are very nervous about how they
would react to a military strike in Iraq; envy of the United
States; and, last but not least, la gloire, the belief
that France is the only country that counts.
When the chips are down, probably tomorrow at the Security
Council, France may veto the latest resolution (though they have
given themselves some wiggle room for a change of heart and, in the
past, have clamored aboard at the last minutes). As for Russia and
China, their standing with France in opposition to the U.S-U.K.
resolution is a rhetorical one. They figure that if there is a
veto, it will come from France. Meanwhile, their public stance is
good for domestic politics. In addition, the Chinese always enjoy
our discomfort in their endless quest to replace us as the dominant
force in the Western Pacific.
You have to hand it to Saddam. His strategy has been a crafty
one which seemed on the verge of success several times. It looks as
if the resolution may pass tomorrow, but pass or fail, veto or no,
George Bush has not and will not blink. For Saddam, time’s up.
