The anti-war, anti-American bloody-mindedness of Jacques Chirac
and Gerhard Schroeder has been analyzed to a fare-thee-well. But
what about their heavyweight supporter, President Vladimir Putin of
Russia?
Last fall, various commentators pegged Putin’s position
precisely:
“Russia’s diplomatic capital in the world is much diminished
since the end of the Cold War, a fact that Mr Putin has been quick
to grasp…Mr Putin is worried that a war with Baghdad would
ruin Russia’s fragile economic recovery…He fears that
Saddam’s demise would bring oil prices, on which Russia depends for
half of its income, crashing down. Russian hardliners may believe
that their president is prepared to ditch the fruits of a year of
bridge-building with the West to stand by former cold war allies in
the Middle East…The smart money still says that after driving
the hardest bargain he can manage, Mr Putin will quietly come
around.” (Julius Strauss, Daily Telegraph, October 12,
2002)
“Russia’s biggest oil company has been assured by President
Vladimir Putin that it will be able to keep its huge stake in
Iraq’s oil fields should Saddam Hussein be deposed, as Moscow seeks
to extract a heavy commercial price for backing the US’s hardline
position on Baghdad.” (Carola Hoyos, Financial Times,
October 4, 2002)
But that was last fall. Resolution 1441 passed on November 8,
with Russia’s vote. Looking back, it is now obvious that France and
Germany never meant what they explicitly said with that vote, that
they were lying all along. Is that what Russia did, too? If Russia
did indeed drive its hard bargain with the U.S., and if the U.S.
met Russia’s price, why didn’t Russia stay bought? Because, as of a
fateful February 10 meeting, it certainly did not.
On that date, President Putin visited France, and began to spout
the Franco-German line. As reported by the AP, Putin appeared on
French television, and “said today that unilateral action (sound
familiar?) against Iraq would be a ‘grave error’ and he hinted that
Russia might be prepared to veto any ‘unreasonable use of
force.’”
Radio Netherlands analyzed Putin’s statement like this, on
February 11: “Russian oil companies have invested heavily in Iraq.
Moscow fears that, when the war is over, the US and Britain will
divide Iraqi oil-concessions among themselves. The Kremlin is also
worried that a sharp drop in oil prices after the war would make
the relatively costly extraction of Russian oil no longer
economically viable.”
One might reasonably observe that we have heard these concerns
before.
At about the same time, Putin sent Soviet-era envoy Yevgeny
Primakov to Iraq to make nice with Saddam Hussein. And by two weeks
later, in Beijing, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced
that Russia was “ready to veto a U.S.- British resolution under
discussion at the U.N. Security Council authorizing war against
Iraq…” (Yahoo News)
Now, what might be going on?
Early post-9/11, Vladimir Putin (“Pooty-Poot,” in George W.
Bush’s affectionate nickname) took the initiative to call the
American President and assure him of his (Putin’s) support. And he
showed tangible evidence of that support, acceding to (“allowing”
being the wrong word) American military use of former Soviet states
along Russia’s southern border (the “Stans”). He got something in
return: The U.S. conceded that the Chechens were “terrorists,” and
the Russians could treat them as such, no more nagging about human
rights violations.
Since the days of the Czars, Russia has wallowed in an
inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West, mostly Western
Europe. And she has displayed aggressive fear of being surrounded,
especially to the South, where the nation has her only warm-water
access to the seas. The United States won handily in Afghanistan
and promises to win handily in Iraq. Look at a map. Then read your
Tolstoy. Nothing new here.
Putin’s reliance on high oil prices has been pointed out. With a
strike in Venezuela cutting off that nation’s production, with war
uncertainties pushing prices higher, Putin may simply be holding
out as long as possible, making as much money as possible. And he
may indeed be worried about the $7 or $8 billion Iraq owes Russia,
and about some rather iffy oil contracts (as much as $40 billion
worth) that Russia holds with Iraq.
There’s nothing here, however, that can’t be worked out with the
U.S., and Putin knows it.
No, I’m afraid of something more sinister. Euro-liberal (and
Paris resident) David Ignatius finessed the issue this way in his
column in the Washington Post February 28: “Putin
succumbed to political pressure from Russian generals, diplomats
and legislators who think the United States is behaving arrogantly
and who want Russia to be more independent of Washington.”
Translation: Putin felt the heat from Communist hard-liners.
Look at the nations involved in this obstruction: Russia, China,
Germany, France. Look at China’s passive-aggressive refusal to take
any responsibility for North Korea. Look at the leadership of the
so-called “peace movement.” The USSR may be dead, but Communism is
not.
This is the Cold War all over again. The good news is, a victory
in Iraq will go a long way toward cutting the trembling knees out
from under resurgent Communist influence in the world.
