The American Spectator

Reader Mail

(Page 3 of 7)

and the subject above! br> -- Edward Del Colle /p> p> GOOD SPEED br> Re: Lt. Col. Hilary Evers and Jed Babbin's exchange in Reader Mail's On the Lighter Side : /p>

Dear Mr. Babbin: Thank you for your thoughtful reply. If you do not mind I would like to continue our discussion. All US Army doctrine calls for 24 continuous operations. I am sure you realize that different commanders and different situations produce different results. What Gen. Franks did or failed to do was situationally not doctrinally driven. I ask that you check the rate of advance during the "Desert Storm" operation and compare it to any other advance by any other Army. I also ask that you review the operations of the 101st Airmobile during that advance. The problems experienced in their insertion were minor compared to what they will experience as the main strike force of an all lite attack. I will tell you that the 101st could not have kept that advance up for another 24 hours; however, the heavy force could have. The long and short of it is that the saw "too light to fight too slow to run" holds true. Strategic quickness does not equate to tactical quickness.

Somalia: "Air power works." Yes, sir (if you have it), air power was not provided to the Rangers because of political considerations. Even if provided it would have had an extremely hard time providing any more support than the LOCHs did. Remember you cannot use a 500 lbs. bomb in a knife fight and a knife fight is what you get using only lite troops. Yes, sir, "Precision ammunition is just that" (if it can do the mission). In Afghanistan lite soldiers were pinned down by mortar fire and air power could not take the mortars out because they were in a protected position. Maybe you remember the story. Look I am not saying that this proposed operation does not need airpower, but -- and it is a big BUT -- even with everything working right as in Afghanistan precision munitions hit things they were not meant to hit and killed friendly troops.

I have studied the area for over 10 years. I would be interested in what makes anyone think that there will be spontaneous support (or any other kind) for the U.S. from anyone in Iraq. The most likely course is that when the fight goes past 30 days (a very good possibility if we only use lite forces) you will see significant Volunteers come into play from all over the Middle East.

"Occupation forces will, in large part, be a heavy force. But that can be brought in later, after tactical surprise is achieved." Two questions: 1. How long do you think the heavy deployment will take since we do not want to tip our hand by deploying them early? 2. Until the heavy force arrives what will be the theater reserve? I suggest that someone consider this question. During the first Gulf War we had a Marine Brigade on the water threatening to land. This fixed the position of a significant portion of Iraq's Army. It also acted as a theater reserve. If we were smart and were really looking for tactical surprise we would be telling everyone we were coming with the heavys. We would move everything back into Kuwait and act like we were going to do a "Desert Storm II." Then try the lite option.

As you can see I do not believe that the events in Afghanistan are repeatable in Iraq. I see what should be a walkover made into a very close-run thing and I do not see the reason why. To me this looks just like the lead up to Somalia where the desk riders structured failure into a can't lose situation and I am not talking about the Rangers. I am talking ROE, no tanks, no artillery etc...

topics:
Religion, Islam, Iraq, Iran, North Korea