The American Spectator

Reader Mail

Nothing But War

10.18.02 @ 12:01AM

THE SNIPER MOVIE
Re: R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.'s Terrorized by Yellow-Bellies:

Recall, if you will, the villain in Dirty Harry. And likewise, remember how he was ultimately dealt with.
-- Harvard Fong
Sacramento, CA

P.S. For those who might not recall: After having terrorized San Francisco via sniper shootings and kidnappings (indeed, the movie opens with such a shooting, in a pool, atop two skyscrapers), the bad guy, Scorpio, is finally blown away by the iconic no-BS cop, Harry Callahan. If only reality could be so (less the long term terror, more the bad-guy removal).

THE MAN WHO SHOT LIBERTY VALANCE
Re: R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.'s Terrorized by Yellow-Bellies:

Kudos to the debonair Mr. Tyrrell on his last few columns. The First Canoeist spanking was a ripper and today's peroration bowing to a consummate American, John Wayne, is top shelf. A great rewind for the wonderful Americans at the Prowler would be She Wore a Yellow Ribbon. John Wayne. as captain Nathan Brittles with two consummate scene stealers, Victor McGlaglen and Barry Fitzgerald. Some of Wayne's other great performances include, The Quiet Man, The Searchers, Red River and the subject above!
-- Edward Del Colle

GOOD SPEED
Re: Lt. Col. Hilary Evers and Jed Babbin's exchange in Reader Mail's On the Lighter Side:

Dear Mr. Babbin: Thank you for your thoughtful reply. If you do not mind I would like to continue our discussion. All US Army doctrine calls for 24 continuous operations. I am sure you realize that different commanders and different situations produce different results. What Gen. Franks did or failed to do was situationally not doctrinally driven. I ask that you check the rate of advance during the "Desert Storm" operation and compare it to any other advance by any other Army. I also ask that you review the operations of the 101st Airmobile during that advance. The problems experienced in their insertion were minor compared to what they will experience as the main strike force of an all lite attack. I will tell you that the 101st could not have kept that advance up for another 24 hours; however, the heavy force could have. The long and short of it is that the saw "too light to fight too slow to run" holds true. Strategic quickness does not equate to tactical quickness.

Somalia: "Air power works." Yes, sir (if you have it), air power was not provided to the Rangers because of political considerations. Even if provided it would have had an extremely hard time providing any more support than the LOCHs did. Remember you cannot use a 500 lbs. bomb in a knife fight and a knife fight is what you get using only lite troops. Yes, sir, "Precision ammunition is just that" (if it can do the mission). In Afghanistan lite soldiers were pinned down by mortar fire and air power could not take the mortars out because they were in a protected position. Maybe you remember the story. Look I am not saying that this proposed operation does not need airpower, but -- and it is a big BUT -- even with everything working right as in Afghanistan precision munitions hit things they were not meant to hit and killed friendly troops.

I have studied the area for over 10 years. I would be interested in what makes anyone think that there will be spontaneous support (or any other kind) for the U.S. from anyone in Iraq. The most likely course is that when the fight goes past 30 days (a very good possibility if we only use lite forces) you will see significant Volunteers come into play from all over the Middle East.

"Occupation forces will, in large part, be a heavy force. But that can be brought in later, after tactical surprise is achieved." Two questions: 1. How long do you think the heavy deployment will take since we do not want to tip our hand by deploying them early? 2. Until the heavy force arrives what will be the theater reserve? I suggest that someone consider this question. During the first Gulf War we had a Marine Brigade on the water threatening to land. This fixed the position of a significant portion of Iraq's Army. It also acted as a theater reserve. If we were smart and were really looking for tactical surprise we would be telling everyone we were coming with the heavys. We would move everything back into Kuwait and act like we were going to do a "Desert Storm II." Then try the lite option.

As you can see I do not believe that the events in Afghanistan are repeatable in Iraq. I see what should be a walkover made into a very close-run thing and I do not see the reason why. To me this looks just like the lead up to Somalia where the desk riders structured failure into a can't lose situation and I am not talking about the Rangers. I am talking ROE, no tanks, no artillery etc...

You are an intelligent observer. Get a map out and look at the terrain that has to be covered. Now tell me how the force we are talking about deploying can cover it all at the same time or in any reasonable time. If you cannot then where does your tactical surprise go? Are you assuming that Saddam's soldiers will just give up? I hope so, but as you know "hope is not a method."
-- Hil Evers
LTC US Army

(Update: Jed Babbin's reply is available here, as part of Monday, October 21st's Reader Mail.)

BELLOC AND LOAD:
Re: George Neumayr's Falwell Was Right:

In George Neumayr's article about Falwell, Islam, intellectuals, etc., he quotes Hillaire Belloc as saying the exact opposite of what he in fact said.

Letter to the Editor

topics:
Religion, Islam, Iraq, Iran, North Korea