The American Spectator

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(Page 5 of 9)

p>Lastly, please consider that Strategic Deployability does not equate to Tactical quickness. br> -- Hilary H. Evers III , LTC, USA br> Deputy, MLT Moldova /p> p> Jed Babbin replies: br> Col. Evers is a thoughtful correspondent. I hope this is a thoughtful response. First, as to the "lightness" of "light" infantry. He makes a good point, but misses one as well. The problem with "heavy" infantry is not its great firepower, but the doctrine that our army operates it under. My objection is to the practice of stopping -- every few dozen miles -- at pre-arranged "staging lines" at which the force halts for hours, even days. If the heavies had more speed and flexibility ( not à la Franks) I would agree more with their use. /p>

Air power works. Period. Somalia? The problem there was not with airpower, but the lack of it. In the "Blackhawk Down" engagement, the Rangers and Delta guys asked for AC-130s as cover, and it was denied them. If it had been present throughout that operation, our casualties would have been far fewer, and Aideed could have been captured or killed. Air power doesn't work if you don't use it.

Precision ammunition is just that. The First Iraq War is over. Check Afghanistan.

The Northern Alliance analogy is correct; there is not one in Iraq. But we have good reason to believe that free Iraqis in Iran and those in Saddam's army who choose not to die for him may well form a core we can deal with. Also, let's not forget the INC. They -- and the former kings of Iraq -- could also play a good role in the new Iraq.

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