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SPEED ALSO KILLS
Re: Jed Babbin's
Speed Saves:
I can appreciate how you would think that a "lite" operation in Iraq would be preferable to a "slow", "old," non-flashy heavy method. Before you flush this email understand that I have no dog in this fight just 27 years of experience. Let me give you a few facts:
1. Light Infantry are not light in anything except firepower. (The heaviest Division in the US Army to deploy is the "lite" 101st Air Mobile Div. and in theater they move slower tactically than a heavy division requiring more support with less firepower// Same for a Marine Div w/o Armor) You got a country 3 times the size of Afghanistan how are you going to move things around? Helo's ? Think again.
2. Air power works great except when your life depends on it. (See Somalia.)
3. Precision ammunition isn't. (Check the friendly fire casualties from the 1st Iraq war.)
4. There is no Northern Alliance in Iraq. (Don't even think about the Kurds).
5. What are you going to occupy with if you are successful?
Also when considering the benefits of lite vs. heavy suggest you read up on the Battle of Jutland WWI 1916. It seems the British had chosen lite vs. armor it cost them the battle and very nearly the war.
"A battlecruiser had the speed of a cruiser and the striking power of a battleship. It was Admiral John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, who first suggested the idea of battlecruisers [Fisher's famous dictum was, "Speed is armour" -- sound familiar?]. The first three battlecruisers, Invincible, Indomitable and Inflexible, were completed for the Royal Navy in 1908. Fisher argued that if a battlecruiser could not destroy a battleship it was attacking, it would always be fast enough to escape. Events in the First World War revealed that although battlecruisers could be impressive in attack, they had defensive weaknesses. Inflexible was badly damaged by a mine at Gallipoli and Invincible exploded and sank after a hit from a German ship during the Battle of Jutland. Queen Mary was also sunk at Jutland with the loss of almost 1,300 lives." Bottom line: armour is armour.
Lastly, please consider that Strategic Deployability does not
equate to Tactical quickness.
-- Hilary H. Evers III, LTC, USA
Deputy, MLT Moldova
Jed Babbin replies:
Col. Evers is a thoughtful correspondent. I hope this is a
thoughtful response. First, as to the "lightness" of "light"
infantry. He makes a good point, but misses one as well. The
problem with "heavy" infantry is not its great firepower, but the
doctrine that our army operates it under. My objection is to the
practice of stopping -- every few dozen miles -- at pre-arranged
"staging lines" at which the force halts for hours, even days. If
the heavies had more speed and flexibility (not à
la Franks) I would agree more with their use.
Air power works. Period. Somalia? The problem there was not with airpower, but the lack of it. In the "Blackhawk Down" engagement, the Rangers and Delta guys asked for AC-130s as cover, and it was denied them. If it had been present throughout that operation, our casualties would have been far fewer, and Aideed could have been captured or killed. Air power doesn't work if you don't use it.
Precision ammunition is just that. The First Iraq War is over. Check Afghanistan.
The Northern Alliance analogy is correct; there is not one in Iraq. But we have good reason to believe that free Iraqis in Iran and those in Saddam's army who choose not to die for him may well form a core we can deal with. Also, let's not forget the INC. They -- and the former kings of Iraq -- could also play a good role in the new Iraq.
Occupation forces will, in large part, be a heavy force. But that can be brought in later, after tactical surprise is achieved. In sum, our initial force will be a mix of light infantry and Marines, air power, and special operations. It will be followed, as quickly as possible -- and long before the operation is over -- with some heavy forces that can be deployed in time. The mix is important, but speed is essential.