The Bush-Blair proposal for a new Security Council resolution
says that Iraq is in “material breach” of the 1991 resolutions
restating the terms of the cease-fire. Only that cease-fire
prevented Baghdad from becoming an R & R center for the First
Marine Division. The “material breach” language would impose a duty
on the U.N. to act when the Iraqis again refuse to allow unlimited
inspections and disarm. But imposing any responsibility for action
on the U.N. is the last thing that Kofi Annan, Russia, China and
France will permit. Worse yet, Kofi is making his own deals to try
to save Saddam.
Lost in last week’s flapdoodle about Terrible Tom’s temper
tantrum was the deal U.N. Secretary General Annan made with Iraq
behind our backs. Unreported here, it was big news in the Middle
East. If you can read through the anti-American vitriol, one of the
best sources for news of the region is the Saudi
government-controlled English language daily, Arab News.
Its reports of Annan’s agreement with Iraq were quite specific and
consistent with both Iraq’s and Annan’s actions.
Iraq’s 16 September letter to Annan references discussions with
him in March, May, July and September. In those discussions, Iraq
agreed to the return of the weapons inspectors on condition that
its “sovereignty” would be respected, meaning that the
“presidential palaces” (where the WMD are produced and stored)
would still be off-limits. A 27 September Arab News report
says this deal between Iraq and Annan allows resumption of
inspections — on the restricted terms Iraq wants — in exchange
for Annan’s promise to “remove the specter of a (U.S.-led) military
aggression” against Baghdad. If the Security Council doesn’t pass
our draft resolution in the next week or two — and it’s a
million-to-one shot that it will — Mr. Bush should take action to
demonstrate to the world that America’s patience with the U.N. (and
its contemptible chief) is exhausted.
Only rank and status matter to the U.N. The President should ask
Congress to reduce the ambassador’s job to a much lower rank.
Sending some snoozing bureaucrat to sit in the meetings and vote
our veto (early and often) would send an unmistakable signal of our
contempt for the U.N., which it has earned.
Mr. Bush can let the U.N. play games for the next few weeks
while he attends to business. First, he needs to decide among the
war plans that have arrived on his desk. Second, he needs to
continue preparing the battlefield and serious training of the
Iraqi opposition’s forces. The war plans are divided between the
“light” vs. “heavy” options the Pentagon has been leaking for
months. Each has strengths and weaknesses.
The “light” option — which I favor strongly — concentrates on
speed rather than size. Its success depends on applying power in a
tightly focused way to destroy military targets with tremendous
speed and precision. Iraqi military assets would be targeted
flexibly, and the pilots and ground commanders authorized to hit
both kinds of targets: the ones we dispatch forces to deal with,
and the “pop-ups” that are spotted on the run, and have to be hit
before they can hide again.
The “lights” would — in the first hour — try to destroy the
missiles that give Saddam his ability to strike outside Iraq.
Widespread special operations strikes would be followed by light
infantry moving quickly, with massed airpower operating both with
ground forces and independently. The next level of military targets
would be subjected to air strikes at a level of intensity the world
has never seen. Coalition forces flew about 300 sorties a day in
the Gulf War. The Iraq campaign would fly between 500 and 1,000
sorties per day. Iraq’s oil fields would be preserved and the
American presence on the ground minimized to ease the concerns of
neighboring Arab governments. The whole thing should be over in a
week. But if targets are more hidden or hardened than we believe,
casualties can be heavy on both sides, and the fight could last too
long.
Gen. Tommy Franks prefers the “heavy” option, relying on massive
tank and infantry formations — perhaps 100,000 strong — driving
Patton-like from Kuwait. This force would move slowly, stopping for
hours or days at preset staging lines only dozens of miles apart.
The crushing power of massed formations would, eventually, defeat
the Iraqi forces.
Franks’s approach — which he used in Afghanistan — imposes an
unheard-of level of tactical micro-management. Franks uses Predator
unmanned aircraft for real-time reconnaissance of small parts of
the battlefield. Instead of keeping the big picture in the front of
his mind, Gen. Franks uses a “soda straw” view of the battlefield
through Predator cameras to make small decisions himself. Decisions
that should be made by the captains, majors and lieutenant colonels
doing the fighting are instead made at the four-star general level.
Against a more capable enemy, this approach could lead to our
defeat.
If Saddam isn’t defeated in a matter of a week or ten days, some
Iraqi forces may be tempted to remain in the fight. If Franks gets
stalled, and it appears Saddam’s regime has a chance to survive,
our other enemies in the region will be emboldened. If Saddam
manages to destroy the few bridges spanning the Euphrates, Franks’s
tanks will sit on the west bank, unable to move, for weeks or
months. Saddam already has the bridges prepared for demolition on a
moment’s notice. If America can be stalemated there, it can be
defeated elsewhere. Delay is itself a defeat.
While the President chooses a war plan, we are preparing the
battlefield. Israeli special forces may already be operating in
Iraq to target the missile batteries that threaten Israeli cities.
I’ll bet that British Special Forces are there too, getting ready
to raise merry old hell. Our air strikes on Iraqi radars as well as
command and control assets should increase in frequency, and be
made whenever the Iraqis target any aircraft enforcing the no-fly
zones. Targets of opportunity that the fly-guys spot will be hit as
well.
If Saddam can be removed with minimal damage to Iraq, and Iraqi
troops forced to surrender quickly rather than be cornered and
slaughtered, America will be seen as a liberator, not a conqueror
preparing to threaten other nations. We must apply our military
power in a way that gives the greatest chance of achieving success:
a free Iraq that is an ally and a partner for the future. Light,
hard and fast, Saddam delendus est.
